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STATEMENT SHOWING .JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisu
Appellate Procedure Rules 3 and 4, and also pursuant to section 78-2-2 of the Utah
Code Annotated (1953).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE
STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED UPON A MATERIAL
BREACH BY THE PLAINTIFF.
! he question of a material breach is a question of law, determined by the
• .

.

: of corre ctness, »A< ith i I : • pre -si in lptioi l of 1 alidit} in tl le

determination made by the lower Court. Darrell J. Dikerickson & Sons. Inc. v. M a g n a
Water and Sewer Improvement District, 613 I '.2d 116 ( I Jtah 1980)

I his issue was

raised w ith the lower Court throughout trial as reflected in the Transcript at page 90
through and including 99, this being only a singular reference of m a n y noted throughout
the Brief;

2
APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT HE IS NOT
ONLY ENTITLED TO RESCISSION, BUT IN ADDITION THERETO, HE IS
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES THAT HE HAS SUSTAINED.
This claim challenges a Finding of Fact, which requires that the Appellant
marshal 1 all of tl ic evidei ice that suppoi ts the si lbject fii: v :lii: ig, c ;it i i thei i si ic) 1 • ' 1 i. : • < tl i s
same is an abuse of discretion by the lower Court. Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087

1

(Utah App. 1995). This was raised many times in the lower Court, one citation of many
found in the Brief is Exhibit 36, found in the addendum.

3.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
ATTORNEYS FEES TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BASIS THAT THE CLAIMS OR
DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANT WERE WITHOUT MERIT AND NOT
ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH.
This a combination question of law, and where the issue is a matter of law, the
Appellate Court reviews the same as a matter of correctness, with no presumption of
validity in the lower Court; and where a question of fact, the Appellate Court presumes
the same to be valid, and the Appellant must marshall all of the evidence, and then show
how the finding of fact was a clear abuse of discretion. Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d
1087, (Utah App. 1995) also Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). This issue
was raised before the lower Court, and is found specifically in the Findings of Fact, item
11.

STATEMENT OF STATUTES
COALVILLE CITY SIGN ORDINANCE, as existed in 1983:
60-4-1 GENERAL SIGN PROVISIONS:
(a) Permits: It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any sign, sign
post, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent advertisement, arch, or any other
structure above, over in or around any part of any street or sidewalk, in the City, without
first obtaining permission so to do from the City Council or its delegated representative.

2

COALVILLE CITY SIGN ORDINANCE, as existed in 1984:
CHAPTER 8, SIGNS:
8.2

Prohibited Signs

The following types od (sic) signs are prohibited:
A.

Off premises signs, except at listed above.
("Above" refers to a list of signs, the off premises signs which are permitted are
temporary political and community public events signs with a maximum 20
square feet area. Defendant's signs are 672 square foot permanent signs.)

8.4 Premit (sic) Required
Unless otherwise provided therein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged until
the sign has been approved and a permit issued by the Zoning Administrator. Sign
permits are valid for a period of five (5) years and are subject to renewal. Application
for sign permits shall be made to the Zoning Administrator and shall include a drawing
showing the sign and location of the proposed sign(s).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case concerns a "Stipulation" that the parties entered into in 1983 settling a
previously filed lawsuit. The Stipulation required the Defendant to provide sufficient
information to the plaintiff City so that it could decide to lease or purchase a sign from
the Defendant; that the Plaintiff would issue valid sign permits to the Defendant; that
the Plaintiff would publish a preference for sign permits for benefit of the Defendant;
and that the Defendant would remove signs according to a schedule. It involves
questions of whether the City had to perform their part of the agreement to purchase the
sign; whether the sign permits which were issued without conforming to the
requirements of the City ordinances were valid; whether after they legislated a change in
the Zoning Ordinance, the plaintiff was still obligated to publish the preference, or
3

whether the Zoning Ordinance change was not in good faith and constitutes a breach of
the Stipulation; whether the defendant was required to perform when the plaintiff was in
breach of its obligations and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees based on its
claims that the Defendant did not raise a meritorious claim or defense.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appeal includes questions of law and fact, regarding who breached the
contract first and whether rescission is appropriate with accompanying damages to make
the Appellant whole.
COURSE AND PROCEEDINGS
The case was originally filed in 1982 in Summit County. A Stipulation was
entered in April of 1983. Subsequently a number of motions were heard between 1986
and 1995. This matter was tried in Coalville, in the Third District Court in and for
Summit County, State of Utah, Judge Frank G. Noel Presiding, on August 15, 1995.
After the Decree was entered, Defendant filed a timely Motion to Alter or Amend,
which was denied, and thereafter the issues herein were appealed to this Court.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted judgment for the Defendant for the Plaintiffs failure to
purchase a sign; found the sign permits valid and enforceable; stated that the Plaintiff
was not in breach of the requirement to publish the preference since the Plaintiff
changed its zoning ordinance making signs illegal and such zoning change was not
prohibited by the Stipulation; yet awarded attorneys fees to the Plaintiff on the basis that

4

the defendant's claims or defenses were not maintained in good faith and were not
meritorious; and ordered the Defendant to remove certain signs.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Appellant claims that he is entitled to rescission and/or damages, based upon the
Defendant's performance followed by the Plaintiff materially breaching the Stipulation.
He further argues that he was not required to perform after the Plaintiff breached the
agreement and is entitled to damages for his performance. Lastly, the Appellant claims
error as a matter of law and as a matter of logic, on the basis that the Court cannot on
the one hand award judgment to the Defendant on his counterclaim, and then find that
the claims or defenses of the Defendant to be lacking merit and not maintained in good
faith and award Plaintiff attorney fees.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about February 16, 1979, Defendant approached Coalville City for

authorization to put nine (9) billboard signs along Interstate 80, within the Coalville
City Limits. (Note the record at page 000183.)
2.

Defendant obtained written permission ("licenses") from the Mayor of

Coalville City, to install the subject nine (9) signs along Interstate 80. (T-317 and
Record at 0005 and following Exhibit 32.)
3.

The Zoning ordinance in place at the time of the installation of the

subject signs provided as follows: (Note Exhibit 30):
5

60-4-1 GENERAL SIGN PROVISIONS:
(a)
Permits: It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any
sign, sign post, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent
advertisement, arch, or any other structure above, over in or around any part
of any street or sidewalk, in the City, without first obtaining permission so
to do from the City Council or its delegated representatives.
4.

Consistent with these provisions that the Applicant get permission form

the City Council or any of its delegated representatives, Defendant paid $144.00 for the
permission ("licenses") to install the subject nine (9) signs. (Note Exhibit 32.)
5.

The erection of the nine signs required an extensive amount of work and

expenditure of both time and money, and once created, the "plant" would be worth as
much as $48,000.00 for each sign. (T-437.)
6.

After the sign licenses were acquired in writing, and after land leases

were obtained, including access to build and maintain signs, and the sign structures
built, certain residents in Coalville expressed harsh concern that the subject signs
diminished the natural beauty of their town. (T-415 and following.)
7.

As a result, in 1982 the City initiated litigation to have the subject signs

removed, on the basis that the City Council had not granted permission, and therefore
signs were illegal. Note paragraph #11 of the Complaint, which states (R-0001):
11.
Defendant presently has constructed and erected nine (9) billboard
signs in Coalville City, Utah, near Interstate 80 without obtaining a permit
as required by 60-4-1(a) of the Coalville City Zoning Ordinance.
Defendant, at the present time, still does not have the required permit.
8.

On or about August 2, 1982, the matter came on regularly for Pre-Trial

Settlement before the Honorable Homer F. Wilinson, and the minute entry at 0015,
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states, "This case comes now on for Pre-Trial. Counsel appeared and matter was
discussed and a stipulation was entered into settling this cause. "
9.

Several versions of the written STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND

ORDER OF DISMISSAL (herein "Stipulation") were exchanged by the parties, over
the course of months and into the following year. The same was signed finally by all
parties by March 24,1983, and thereafter signed by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
on April 5, 1983.
10.

Terry Christiansen, who was Counsel for the Plaintiff at the time of the

preparation of the Stipulation, did not recall at the time of trial who in fact prepared the
same, he therefore assumed that Counsel for the Defendant prepared the same by virtue
of the fact that Defendant's Counsel's name appeared in the upper right hand corner of
the final version (T-63). Nevertheless, the entire record bears out that Terry
Christiansen prepared all thirteen paragraphs of the same, and only paragraph 1 was
changed by the parties in the several versions that were prepared between August 1982
and March 1993. Compare page 0037 of the Record with page 0058 of the Record:
(a)

Page 0037 of the Record is an Affidavit signed by Terry Christiansen,

which states in paragraph 3, as follows:
3.
In August, 1982, the parties entered into a settlement of the above
action rather than proceed to trial which was set for August 31, 1982.
During the period August 15, 1982 through March 31, 1983 the parties
considered various drafts of the Stipulation of Dismissal and Order of
Dismissal which drafts and consideration was necessitated by concern
solely over paragraph 1 of the Stipulation of Dismissal

1

(b)

Page 0058 of the Record is a Memorandum filed by Defendant's Counsel

on May 28, 1986, which states:
By way of background, the Plaintiff and the Defendant had been attempting
for several months to achieve an acceptable stipulation to dismiss the
above-captioned case. The Plaintiff drafted the first edition of the
stipulation, and that edition was retyped with several minor changes by the
Defendant and returned to the Plaintiff The order contained in the
Stipulation and Order dismisses Plaintiff *s complaint. This Order was
originally drafted by the Plaintiff in the first edition of the Stipulation and
was never changed.
11.

The parties finally agreed on the terms for the Plaintiff to either purchase

or lease a sign from the Defendant, which were the changes that were referenced by
Terry Christiansen's Affidavit at page 0037 of the Record. (T-74 and following.)
12.

The language of the Stipulation is the drafting of the Plaintiffs counsel,

and therefore any ambiguity in the same should be construed against the Plaintiff,
notwithstanding the fact that the final draft has the name of Counsel for the Defendant
in the upper right hand corner. (T-412).
13.

On March 23,1983, the Coalville City Council held a meeting, where the

Stipulation was signed by Terry Cliristiansen as City Attorney and Mayor Johnson..
The minutes of this "Special Meeting" state the following (Note Exhibit 26 in
Addendum):
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned the billboards with All Associates.
He mentioned the present schedule of the present billboards. The Mayor
said that the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be used as
a "Welcome to Coalville " sign. Al Lundgren said his costs would not be
more than $5,200.00. If Coalville City bought the sign and took over the
lease on the land until it runs out with C.B. Copely. Terry Christiansen
said the bill should be itemized. He suggested that we made a decision now
that this can be settled. He advised buying the sign so that we have a
8

chance of getting the rest of the signs down, in the future. If we don V buy
the sign, we will he back in litigation and with our present zoning
ordinances, we would probably lose. If the City buys the sign then they will
have to maintain it. As long as the contract and lease on the property.
Terry Christiansen said we have four choices: 1. Sign the agreement and
buy the sign so that all of the signs will be down in 20 years, 2. Go with the
lawsuit that we will probably lose. Leaving the signs up indefinitely. 3.
Drop the lawsuit and the signs will be up as long as he wants them, or 4.
Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made the motion that we purchase the sign
in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. Sargent, second the motion. All
Ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The Mavor and Attorney signed the
Order of Dismissal. (Emphasis added.)
14.

About the same time that the Stipulation was signed by the Mayor and

Terry Christiansen, the Defendant withdrew his signature and agreement to be bound by
the Stipulation. His counsel submitted a letter to Plaintiffs counsel withdrawing the
Defendant's acceptance of the agreement. (T-120.)
15.

In late 1983 the City amended its zoning ordinance and prohibited off

premise signs, and appointed a zoning administrator who was responsible for issuing
permits. The ordinance did not contain a "preference" for permits for Defendant.
(Addendum, Coalville Sign Ordinance, Chapter 8.)
16.

Defendant was unaware that the Stipulation was submitted to the Court

and that the Court accepted it on April 15, 1983, and that the Plaintiff considered it
valid, until he received a demand letter from Terry Christiansen in 1986 to remove a
sign along the freeway as contemplated in the Stipulation. Defendant refused, because
the Plaintiff had never leased or purchased the sign as required in Paragraph 1 of the
Stipulation and because he thought the Stipulation was not in effect. (T-123.)

9

17.

The City brought an Order to Show Cause, and the Defendant was

required to remove a sign, notwithstanding the fact that the City had never complied
with the subject Stipulation to either lease or purchase the sign pursuant to the
Stipulation paragraph 1. (R-00334 and following.)
18.

Wholly independent o f the duty of the City to lease or purchase a sign

from the Defendant, the Defendant contracted with the Camber of Commerce to provide
sign space for the sum of $600.00. (T-155 and following.)
19.

Defendant took a loss to build and erect the sign from the Chamber of

Commerce, however he did it for public relations reasons. (T-149 and T-154.)
20.

Even though the Plaintiff had nothing to do with the sign for the

Chamber of Commerce, Plaintiff sought and obtained a Court Order restraining the
Defendant from taking down the Chamber sign. (T-141 and following.)
21.

The terms and conditions between the Defendant and the Chamber of

Commerce allowed the Defendant to remove the sign face at anytime, and so the
Defendant removed the sign face, but only after the Plaintiff acknowledge that it was
not their sign and they had no interest in the same. (T-149, T-150 and T-160.)
22.

A number of motions and petitions were filed by each party, but instead

of ruling on them, the court scheduled trial before the Honorable Frank Noel, District
Court Judge, on August 15 and 16, 1995. (R-0091 and following.)
23.

The plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was in contempt for taking

down the Chamber sign and requested attorneys fees for the various times they had to
bring the Defendant before the Court for his refusal to remove the subject signs. The
10

Defendant claimed that he was entitled to rescission on the Stipulation for the material
breach by the Plaintiff, and for damages stemming from the same. (Record 0091-95 and
R-0106-0110.)

ARGUMENT ONE: DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED UPON A
MATERIAL BREACH BY THE PLAINTIFF.
Appellants submit that they are entitled to rescission of the Stipulation on the
basis that the Plaintiff/Appellee breached every essential term of the Stipulation. A
careful review of the matter will reflect that there were several material elements of
the Stipulation that the Plaintiff was to perform, and that Plaintiff in fact did not
perform a single one. These facts are clear and undisputed in the record and the trial
court erred by ignoring these undisputed facts.

A.
The Permission Granted by the City in 1979 Was Valid, but the City
Wanted the Signs Removed for Political Reasons and Did Not Act in Good
Faith.
In 1979, Mr. Lundgren, doing business as All Associates, Inc. approached the
City of Coalville to install nine (9) billboards along Interstate 80, within the
Coalville City limits (T-319). Consistent with the sign ordinance at the time, he
obtained written permission in the form of "licenses" from the Mayor Ball of
Coalville City and paid the license fee for nine (9) signs.
Exhibit 30, included in the addendum, states the following:

11

60-4-1(a):
Permits. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or
construct any sign, signpost, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent
advertisement, arch or any other structure above, over, in or around any
part of any street or sidewalk in the City, without first obtaining permission
so to do from the City Council or its delegated representatives.
Accordingly, the Defendant could obtain "permission" from the City council
or any of its "delegated representatives". Clearly, the Mayor could bind the City,
regarding the signs as one of the "delegated representatives." As noted in Exhibit 32,
included in the Addendum, Mr. Lundgren paid $144.00 for nine (9) sign licenses.
After spending substantial sums to acquire the land leases, paying for
permits/licenses, and doing all of the legwork, the Defendant built nine (9) signs or
the "plant." (T-356, T-314, and T-346.)
After the Defendant installed the signs, certain individuals did not want the
town 'cluttered' with the signs, and insisted with the City Council that the signs
come down. (T-415-416.) The City of Coalville then initialed litigation to force the
removal of the subject signs. Record at 0001-0004. Thereafter, the parties entered
into the Stipulation.
It is most important to note that the Minutes of the City Council confirms in
two different places that the City of Coalville did not expect to win the litigation.
This supports Defendant's claim that the City was willing to put anything into the
Stipulation, requiring the subject signs to come down, when Plaintiff had no
intention to comply with the Stipulation in good faith.
//
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B.
The Stipulation Was Drafted by the Plaintiff and Should Be Construed
Against It.
Note Exhibit 26, an excerpt with Terry Christiansen on the stand testifying
regarding the Minutes of the City Council:
Q.

Pickup there where it says Terry Christiansen said, would you read
that briefly to the Court?

A.

"Terry Christiansen said we have four choices. One, signing the
agreement for the sign so all the signs will be down in 20 years. Two,
go to the lawsuit that we 7/ probably lose, leaving the signs up
indefinitely. Three, dropping the lawsuit and the signs will be up as
long as he wants then, or four, condemn them.

According to the sworn statement of Terry Christiansen in his Affidavit
found at page 0037, Terry Christiansen in fact drafted the entire Stipulation and the
Defendant only changed a few words in the same. (Plaintiff Exhibit 1 included in the
addendum.)
It is widely accepted that any ambiguity in the Stipulation should be resolved
in favor of the other party. Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d
798, 807 (Utah 1992). Plaintiff substantially drafted the document.

C.
The City Specifically Understood and Agreed to the Terms of the
Stipulation.
Not only did Plaintiffs Counsel draft the Stipulation but the whole City
Council officially approved it. The transcript at page 217 states:
Q.

And is it fair to say that the City Council read the Stipulation before
you were authorized to sign on behalf of Coalville City?

A.

Yes.
13

D.

Q.

And so how many people of the City Council read Exhibit 1 before
you signed it.

A

I would say all of them did.

Q.

Let me focus on my question. Did you discuss it in the City Council?

A,

We discussed the Stipulation.

Q.

The terms of the stipulation?

A.

The terms of the stipulation were discussed.

Q,

All 13 paragraphs ?

A.

All 13 paragraphs.

Q.

The people of the city council when this was passed were fairly
educated people that would understand all that's in the document,
would they not, as far as you know?

A.

They weren 7 all lawyers, no.

Q.

Fairly educated people, though? They were public officials in the city
and they, at least, knew what they wanted to do and what they were
doing because you were binding the city when you signed the, did you
not?

A.

Right. But to say they were educated, that *s a broad term.

The City Breached its Duty to Purchase or Lease a Sign.
As reflected in Exhibit 26, Coalville City passed a motion to purchase a sign

from the Defendant, in order to meet its obligations of paragraph 1 of the Stipulation.
This commitment to buy a sign from the Defendant was confirmed by Terry
Christiansen at page 85 of the transcript, and Mayor Johnson stated on page 257 of
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the transcript, "He insisted that it being in there, yes. And we agreed to buy the
sign,"
Appellant respectfully submits that it is critical for the Court to note, that
even though the City of Coalville agreed to purchase the sign, it never did, and that
failure was held by Judge Frank Noel to be a breach of the agreement between the
parties, and no one appealed from that part of the decision by the lower court. The
Notice of Appeal filed by the Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross Appellant, states:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff Coalville City, crossappeals to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure that portion of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree dated October 26, 1995 that awarded the Defendant Alvin
R. Lundgren pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff further seeks award of
additional attorney's fees incurred in this appeal
Dated this 1st day of February, 1996.
/s/KiraE. Macfarlane
Kira E. Macfarlane
Attorney for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff breached the contract and agreement between the parties, in the
Stipulation paragraph 1, and is not contesting that fact before this Court.

E.
The City Agreed to Issue Permits for the Signs, but the Permits Which
Were Issued Were Not in Compliance with the Ordinances of the City; Are
Therefore Invalid; and the City Is in Breach of the Stipulation for Failure to
Issue Valid Permits, Which Resulted in Damages to the Defendant.
Stipulation paragraphs 2 through 9 inclusive, have identical language calling
for the Plaintiff to issue sign permits to the Defendant permitting the Defendant to
maintain the signs until certain times when they would be removed.
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As noted above, the "licenses" that the Defendant acquired in 1979-1981
from the Mayor of Coalville, were challenged by Plaintiff as being defective because
the City Council did not approve them. (Note Complaint at 001 and following.)
However, the plain language of the Coalville City Zoning Ordinance at 60-4-01(a),
states that "It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any sign...
without first obtaining permission to do so from the City Council or its delegated
representatives. " (Emphasis added.)
This ordinance was in effect at the time of the signing of the Stipulation,
however the law was changed after this Stipulation was signed. (T. at 232.) It is
critical to note that this language was substantially changed to the point that not just
any delegated representative could sign the requisite permits, but only the "Zoning
Administrator". (Chapter 8.4, Coalville Sign Ordinance, Exhibit 31.)
As noted in Exhibit 31, which is attached in the Addendum is the following:
Chapter 8, SIGNS:
8.4
Premit (sic) Required
Unless otherwise provided herein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or
enlarged until the sign has been approved and a permit issued by the
Zoning Administrator. Sign permits are validfor a period of five (5) years
and are subject to renewal. Application for sign permits shall be made to
the Zoning Administrator and shall include a drawing showing the design
and location of the proposed sign(s).
Hence, the old ordinance required permission from the City Council or its
delegated representatives, whereas the new ordinance required that the permit "shall"
be issued by the "Zoning Administrator." The Zoning Administrator was apparently
William M. Judd, (as reflected in Exhibit 33, which is included in the addendum) as
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he approved the sign for Summit Mercantile, according to the official minutes of the
City Council.
The permits ostensibly issued to conform to the Stipulation were prepared by
Mayor Johnson and his secretary, neither of which were Zoning Administrators. (T
at page 239.)
The new ordinance also prohibited off-premises signs1. (Chapter 8.1, 8.2
Coalville Sign Ordinance, Addendum) The Defendant's signs are off-premises
signs, also known as billboards. (Exhibit 12.)
Therefore the Plaintiff breached each and every paragraph from 2 through 9
inclusive, as no Zoning Administrator ever issued Mr. Lundgren any permits, and the
new ordinance prohibited off-premise signs. The permits were not and are not valid.
In fact, Mayor Johnson testified that he intentionally waited until the new
ordinance went into effect before he purported to issue permits to the Defendant. (T28 and following also note T at 220 and following.) He testified at trial that he not
only waited until 1985 to issue the alleged permits, but he had no knowledge whether
these "permits" were ever delivered to the Defendant at any time. (Note the
Transcript at page 220 and following.)
When pressed regarding not being authorized to issue permits, and that only
the Zoning Administrator was authorized by law to issued the subject permits, Mayor
Johnson testified on page 239 as follows:
1

The 'new' sign ordinance adopted in 1983 and effective in 1984 prohibited off premises signs
except for temporary political and community public event signs not to exceed 20 square feet of sign area.
Defendant's signs are permanent structures with 672 square feet of sign area.
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/ understand what you 're getting at and I don 7 see anything here which
says that the mayor should take and sign them. If I signed them in
ignorance of the law, then that's what I did. I signed them at the advice of
my attorney and the city council at the time.
However the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the City Council ever
considered the permits, neither did the City Attorney testify that he told the Mayor to
sign the permits. Mayor Johnson said that he prepared the form and had the
secretary type them up. That is all that happened. He never even considered the new
ordinance.
Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation states:
10.
It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
that the Defendant will remove signs for which the Defendant does not have
a permit, on or before the expiration of the permit period taking into
considerations the weather conditions of Coalville, Utah.
Lundgren testified at trial that the permits were not delivered until 1986, after
the City commenced an action to have a sign removed. Paragraph 10 requires the
Defendant to take down a sign for which he did not have the permits contemplated in
paragraphs 2 though 9 inclusive, yet the sign required to come down in 1985
(paragraph 2) did not even get a permit until after the date it was supposed to come
down. (Exhibit 12.)
The issue of materiality in not getting valid permits was testified to, without
contradiction or refutation by the Defendant, beginning at page 319 and following.
It is critical to note that the City of Coalville did not ever issue any valid
permits, after they expressly agreed to do so as contemplated in Stipulation
paragraphs 2 through 9 inclusive, the bogus permits they claimed to have issued long
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after the signing of the Stipulation, on their very terms violated the express
agreement between the parties. The parties expressly agreed in paragraph 12, that
the Defendant could solely determine which signs would come down when:
12.
It is agreed and understood that the Defendant may apply the
permits granted herein to the existing sign structures and locations
individually as the Defendant deems appropriate, and that the Plaintiff will
not control which permit is applied to which sign.
However, as noted in Exhibit 12, the bogus permits expressly called for the
signs to come down on a schedule determined by the City, in direct contradiction to
the agreement between the parties. Each of the permits has an expiration date
inserted by the Mayor, not the Defendant.
Hence, the Plaintiff breached paragraphs 2 through 12 inclusive in that they
never issued a single valid permit, the did not attempt to issue even the bogus permits
until well after the fact, and lastly, the bogus permits expressly called for the signs to
come down in order as the City directed, and not as agreed to by the parties.
The City argued before the lower Court at 322, that they did not challenge the
permits and therefore they are de facto valid. The problem with this line of
reasoning is that the Defendant was compelled to take the matter back to the Court,
to obtain a Court Order to get that for which he bargained. Furthermore and more
importantly the Defendant sustained damages during the time that the bogus permits
were in dispute. Mr. Lundgren testified on page 320 as follows:
After the Stipulation was signed, say in 1986, and through probably today,
the fact that we were in a battle with the City of the validity of the permits
and other issues; our ability to sell signs, particularly in the Coalville area,
has been severely hampered.
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On page 323, Mr. Lundgren testified that the questions over the bogus
permits were a lingering problem and affected him financially, like a "lis pendens"
does to real property.
It is critical for this Court to note that there was no evidence to the contrary,
and no refutation whatsoever to any of the testimony regarding the affect that it had
on the Defendant and the damages he sustained.

F.
The City Breached its Promise to Publish a Preference, and Changed the
Zoning Ordinance, All in Bad Faith.
Appellant respectfully submits that the most bold and flagrant violation of the
Plaintiff Coalville City's obligation to act in good faith and fair dealing, is in
reference to paragraph 13 of the Stipulation which reads:
13.
It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue
of its existing signs, will have priority over any applicant who does not have
an existing sign, and the Plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps are
necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made a part of the
published sign policy of the Plaintiff City.
As Noted at page 0037, and 0058 of the Record, Counsel for the Plaintiff
drafted this provision of the Stipulation, without any modification whatsoever by the
Defendant.
To understand the real bad faith by Coalville City, it must be remembered
that the City Council minutes reflect in two places in Exhibit 26, that the City was in
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a lawsuit that they did not expect to win, and so they expressly stated we must agree
to these terms, or the signs are going to stay up indefinitely.
On page 93 of the Transcript, Mr. Christiansen, testified as follows:
Q.

You talked here this morning about the notion that Coalville City was
contemplating putting together a new code, correct?

A.

Correct?

Q.

And here, we are talking about the priority of the Plaintiff going into
the published sign policy, would they be the same?

A.

Yes.

When questioned further about the language in the Stipulation, Terry
Christiansen testified beginning on page 94 as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Walsh)
It was your intent, was it not, that the defendant
was going to be published in the new code coming up from zoning?

A.

I can't imagine that the defendant's name would be there. Okay?
Obviously, the zoning code would deal with signs; but I can't imagine
that the code itself would put his name in ti because codes are general
laws. And I've never seen a code where that took place.

Q.

So, where were they going to publish it?

A.

I don 7 really know; it could be the code or it could be a policy.

Q.

Have the policy. That wouldn 7 be in the code?

A.

Possibly.

Q.

Says they 're going to t(insure that this priority " would be published.
Can you tell me what you did in reference to that?

A.

I can't.

Q.

Tell me what the City did in reference to that?
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A.

leant

Q.

But again, it is your testimony that that [publishedpreference] was
clearly material to the defendant?

A.

As was every other paragraph.

Appellant submits that the Plaintiff not only breached all material elements of
the second half of their duties as contemplated in paragraph 13 of the Stipulation, but
they even more boldly and flagrantly breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the breach of the first half of paragraph 13.
The first paragraph of 13 reads:
13.
It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue
of its existing signs, will have apriority over any applicant who does not
have an existing sign. . .
Mr. Lundgren testified beginning page 324 of the Transcript in answer to the
question as to whether this provision was important as follows:
This whole paragraph was of the utmost concern to us. We were giving up
our advertising signs and this was our business. We had at this time, maybe
eleven or twelve locations with six of them being at risk and going to be
removed. We needed assurances that number one, if we were going to take
the signs down, we didn 7 want to get into a situation where we had to
remove a sign and then somebody could come up in back of us and get a
permit and application from the City and replace us. And the City said
we 're going to give you all the assurances that we can possibly give you
that you have first option on any sign location that comes available. You We
going to take your sign down. And if we allow them to go back in, you We
the first in line.
Q.

Now, are you talking about billboards on Interstate 80?

A.

I don't think we were talking about billboards on Interstate 90. We were
trading off all of our advertising business and income for the right to put up
any new sign or losing the advertising and we know that. We \e got to have
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some rights to put up and replace that business with something else. And it
wasn V limited to just billboard signs or off-premise signs, or signs on 1-80. It
was a very broad brush, and what we bargainedfor to compensate for every
thing that we are losing.
When asked how long the benefits intended to flow to the Defendant,
stemming from paragraph 13 on page 332, Defendant stated:
Our understanding is it would go on indefinitely. In typical circumstances,
you put a billboard up and it stays up indefinitely. We were giving up our
right and changing that for a term of years for another indefinite right.
All of this was confirmed by the testimony of Denver Snuffer beginning at
page 418 and following, and particular the quid-pro-quo that the Defendant was
getting versus what he was giving up.
Plaintiff, instead of acting with good faith and fair dealing, intentionally
refused to give the Defendant any priority of any kind, rather they prepared a new
zoning code, and then they put in the code, not that what Lundgren had bargained
for, but that billboard signs would not be allowed. (Note the Transcript at page 247.)

G.
The Terms of the Stipulation Were Material to the Agreement Between
the Parties and the Stipulation Would Not Have Been Agreed to Without the
Material Terms, and the City Acted in Bad Faith in Entering into and
Enforcing its Obligations under the Stipulation.
Because Appellant requests this Court to order the rescission of the
Stipulation; Appellant submits that every witness agreed that each of the thirteen (13)
paragraphs of the Stipulation was material. Plaintiffs Counsel Terry Christiansen,
testified on page 90 as follows:
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Q.

Do you remember discussions as to how material that was to the
defendant?

A.

Not discussions. Ijust remember that it was material otherwise, it
wouldn 't be there.

On page 92, under cross-examination, Terry Christiansen stated:
Q.

It is fair to say, Mr. Christiansen, that that was material to the
defendant, was it not?

A.

Oh, Vm sure every paragraph in there was material.

Again on page 96, Terry Christiansen testified as follows:
Q.

But again, is it your testimony that that was clearly material to the
defendant?

A.

As was every other paragraph.

Not only did Plaintiffs Counsel Terry Christiansen testify as to the
materiality of the provision of the Stipulation to the Defendant, so did the Mayor
who signed the Stipulation, when he testified on page 257, of how the Defendant
insisted on certain terms in the Stipulation.
Mr. Lundgren testified as to the materiality of paragraph 1 in the stipulation
at page 304. On page 313 of the Transcript, Mr. Lundgren testified as to how
material the valid permits were to him, and then at page 316 and following he
testified as to how these bogus permits issued by the City affected the marketability
of the signs, etc. At page 324, Mr. Lundgren testified as to the importance of
paragraph 13, when he stated, "This whole paragraph was of utmost concern to us.
We were giving up our advertising signs and this was our business. . . "
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Apparently the City put anything into this Stipulation with no intent of ever
following through on their side of the agreement, just as long a the signs came down.
Note for example, paragraph 13, as drafted by Plaintiffs Counsel,
13.
It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue
of its existing signs, will have priority over any applicant who does not have
an existing sign, and the Plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps are
necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made apart of the
published sign policy of the Plaintiff City. (Emphasis added.)
This is what the City wrote into the agreement to get the signs to come down,
otherwise they were facing litigation that they expected to lose and the signs would
remain indefinitely. However, when it came to the time for performance, both City
Attorney Christiansen and Mayor Johnson each testified that they did not
"understand" what this meant, as it would be 'really heavy if it meant being granted a
priority over any applicant, and that the priority would be published in the official
sign policy.' (Note the Transcript at 93 and following.)
On page 222 of the Transcript Mayor Merlyn Johnson testified regarding
paragraph 13, where it states, "It is agreed and understood. . . ", as follows:
Q.

So, I understand, the [new zoning] ordinance went into place in 1984,
correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And when we talk here in Paragraph IS, about a "published sign
policy" what did that mean to you then?

A.

I don 7 know what a sign policy is.

Q.

You have no idea of what this was, just a few inches above your own
signature? Is that what you 're telling the Court.
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A.

That's what I'm telling the Court.

The Mayor goes on to testify that there were many drafts of the agreement, and many
discussions with their Attorney as to terms and conditions of settling this lawsuit,
and that they openly admitted in City Council that they were going to lose.
Appellant must admit, even now, that to suggest that one is going to get an
official priority over any applicant that comes in to Coalville City for a sign permit,
coupled with an agreement to be published in the official sign policy with the subject
priority, is extraordinary, perhaps beyond what the City may legitimately do. In
considering what to do at this point, rescission is the only appropriate remedy,
coupled with the necessary damages to put the parties back where they were before
the meaningless Stipulation that was prepared by the Plaintiffs Counsel was signed.
Plaintiff started in the negotiations in 1983 - giving up nothing, as they fully
expected to lose the lawsuit that they had filed, as reflected in the Official City
Council Minutes. Then they engage in negotiations calling for them to do various
things that they commit to under the notion that it is "agreed and understood".
However, when it is time to perform, they come back and say:
We agreed to buy a sign and didn 7. So what? We agreed to issue permits,
but it turned out that we intentionally waited until the Mayor could no longer
legally issue them2, but he issued them anyway without even a reference to
the new ordinance, and even then the bogus permits calledfor a time certain
for the signs to come down, when the parties expressly agreed to the
contrary, not to mention that we never even delivered them to the Defendant
until after the time the first sign was to come down. So what? We promised
2

Note the permits are dated 1985, and the new zoning ordinance was effective in 1984, therefore
not even the Zoning Administrator could legally issue the permits which were for billboard signs, prohibited in the
1984 zoning ordinance. Chapter 8.1, 8.2 Coalville Sign Ordinance, 1984, Addendum.
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to give the defendant apriority, and publish this priority in the official sign
policy. We know we agreed and understood these terms, but now we are
saying it can 7 mean what it says on the one hand, yet on the other, if it does
mean that, then we don Y know what it means. Besides, we don Y have to
because we changed the ordinance. So what? " (T-87, T-93 and following,
andT-221 and following.) (Paraphrased.)
After totally ignoring everything in the Stipulation, the Plaintiff continued to
haul the Defendant before the Court to force the signs to come down pursuant to the
Stipulation. Such actions are patent bad faith. At a minimum the City should have
tendered some sort of performance. The only thing the City did was to issue illegal
permits years after signing the Stipulation. Then the trial court "rewarded" Plaintiff
its attorneys fees for doing so. The trial court erred.

H.
The Law Enforces a Stipulation as a Contract, Which Charges Any
Ambiguity to the Drafter, and Any Material Breach Allows for Rescission and
Damages.
When the parties signed the Stipulation, calling for each of the parties to
perform certain duties, they signed a compromise and settlement which constituted
an executory accord or a contract. L & A Drywall. Inc. v. Witmore Construction
Co.. 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980); Cox Construction Company v. State Road
Commission, 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978).
Any ambiguity in the Stipulation between the parties, must be construed
against the drafter of the document. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah).
The Plaintiffs attorney drafted the Stipulation, with only changes to paragraph 1 by
the parties, the remaining twelve (12) paragraphs were substantially unchanged.
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The contract must be construed in light of the reasonable expectations of the
parties as evidenced by the purpose and language of the contract. Nixon and Nixon.
Inc. v. John New & Associates. 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982); HCA Health Services of
Utah. Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities. 843 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1993), also Maack v.
Resource Design & Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994). The
expectation of these parties manifest in the Stipulation is that the Plaintiff expected
(a) to be able to buy or lease a sign, and (b) that all of the signs would be removed
over a period of years. The Defendant expected that he would get (a) the financial
and prestige benefits from the purchase or lease of a sign by the City; (b) valid
permits which could not be contested by the City, and which had marketability; (c)
the financial value and prestige from having a preference published in the sign
ordinances giving him the first right to future sign permits.
Whether a particular breach is material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed
by the Appellate Court, with no presumption of correctness. Darrell J. Didericksen
& Sons. Inc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist.. 613 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980); McCarren v. Merrill. 389 P.2d 732 (Utah, 1964) and Saunders v. Sharp. 840
P.2d 796 (Utah App. 1992). All of the participating parties to the creation of the
Stipulation testified that each of the thirteen (13) paragraphs of the Stipulation were
material, and that the Stipulation would not have been signed without each of them.
The testimony is clear and unrefuted that the City in one way or another failed to
perform or expressly breached each of its duties under the Stipulation.
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The Court is to determine as a matter of law, whether there is any ambiguity
in the contract and if there is no ambiguity in the contract, the Court is not to allow
extrinsic evidence to modify or change the express terms. If however, there is some
ambiguity then extrinsic evidence is allowed, but only to clarity the ambiguity.
Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). Here, the contract was clear and
unambiguous. It was drafted the City attorney, and then read and approved by the
City Council and by the Court.3
In the larger sense this Stipulation, by virtue of the accompanying Court
approval, became the law of the case, and became an Order from the Court, and
therefore any interpretation of the same is clearly a question of law, reviewed by this
Court for correctness without any presumption of validity. Provo City Corp. v.
Nielson Scott Co. 699 P.2d 803, (Utah, 1979) also Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d
714 (Utah, 1985).
As stated above, and as testified at the same of trial, the Plaintiff got what it
wanted in this action, i.e., the signs would come down. Frankly a goal that the City
openly admitted in the official City Council Meeting, one that it did not expect to
obtain by the lawsuit that it had filed. On the other hand, the Defendant gave up his

3

If there is any ambiguity it is whether the language of paragraph thirteen (13) regarding priority
for permits is limited to permits for off-premise signs or includes all sign permits. The language is broad, and
unrestricted. The City did not limit in any manner the type of signs in the preference. However, the trial court
found that the preference applied only to off-premise signs. This was error on part of the trial court, which should
have relied on the language of the Stipulation, not extrinsic testimony. Regardless of this possible ambiguity, the
outcome of this appeal is not substantially affected if the Court finds that the City is in material breach and orders
rescission and damages to restore the Defendant to substantially the same condition as he would have been without
the Stipulation.
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very valuable signs in exchange for the City purchasing a sign from Defendant;
getting valid permits; a priority over any other applicants for signs in the area, and a
published priority in the official sign policy for Plaintiff City. Yet, he got nothing
for which he bargained. He is entitled to rescission.
What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify rescission is not easily
reduced to precise statement, but certainly a failure of performance which
"defeats the very object of the contract" or "(is) of such prime importance
that the contract would not have been made if default in the particular had
been contemplated" is a material failure. Polvglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb.
591 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1979).
The participating drafters of the Stipulation each agreed that the thirteen paragraphs
were material. If the Defendant did not obtain the benefit from a single paragraph,
the purposes of the Stipulation would have been materially breached. Here the
Plaintiff breached each of its obligations, and the Defendant got virtually nothing for
his performance.
When Mayor Johnson filed suit in 1982 he was correct in his conclusion that
the City cannot overlook its own ordinances. In Sandy City v. Salt Lake County.
827 P.2d 212 (Utah, 1992), this Court ruled that the county administrative officials
may not forfeit the power of enforcement by disregarding an ordinance. In Salt Lake
County v. Katchner. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1979) and Town of Alta v. Ben Hame
Corp.. 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992) the Appellate Courts held that actions of a
city representative do not preclude the city of a municipality from enforcing its own
ordinances. This case law places the Defendant in the awkward position of having
permits which were issued in violation of the city ordinances, and leaves the
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Defendant at the mercy of any subsequent administration which may elect to
challenge the permits. Here, Plaintiff Coalville City argues that they never
challenged their own bogus permits and therefore is excused from issuing valid
permits. That is a self serving argument. There is nothing which prevents a
subsequent administration from discovering that the permits were issued in violation
of the published ordinance and filing suit. In fact the subsequent administration may
be required to enforce its ordinances regardless of the action of the administrator.
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra.
In Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App.
1992) the Court of appeals held that the County could not repudiate its own contract,
even where they felt that the contract did not conform to their normal procedures.
Therefore the Plaintiff cannot simply complain that they do not understand, or that it
is irregular or unusual; the Plaintiff is compelled to comply with its contract. They
were compelled to either purchase the sign, issue valid permits and publish the
preference or stand in material breach of their agreement.
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been
a material breach of the contract by the other party. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb,
591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).
Rescission is a restitutionary remedy which attempts to restore the parties to
the status quo to the extent possible or as demanded by the equities in the case.
Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe.
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799 P.2d 716, 731 (Utah App. 1990). Furthermore, it is the breaching party who
bears whatever burden is necessary to restore the offended party:
It has also been said that where a contract is not performed, the party who is
guilty of the first breach is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability
for the nonperformance. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 281, 28 Utah 2d 134
(Utah 1972).
This case is unique in that the Stipulation is cast so that its performance by
the Defendant actually work to his disadvantage, i.e., he must remove signs. (The
"quid pro quo" was that the Defendant expected that the required performance by the
Plaintiff would provide other opportunities to offset the loss of the signs.) Here he
removed signs, but received absolutely no offsetting benefit. To restore the
defendants to the pre-Stipulation status initially requires (1) re-installation of their
removed signs; and (2) compensation for the lost income for the period of time the
signs are down. The matter is complicated since the plaintiff changed its sign
ordinances and made these signs illegal. Therefore, the Court must either order the
plaintiff to take the appropriate action to allow the signs to be legally reinstalled; or
alternately, at a minimum, order the plaintiff to pay the defendant the reasonable
market value of its signs (plus the lost income for the period of time the signs were
down). While this later measure does not fully compensate the Defendant since he is
deprived the future income off of the signs, it is the most reasonable approximation
of the damages. See, Argument Two.
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I.

The Plaintiff Violated the Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
Defendant respectfully submits that there is clearly an intentional breach of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the case of Olympus Hills Shopping
Center. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 899 P.2d 445 at 451 (Utah App.
1994), the Court of Appeals summarized the duty in every contact, to act in good
faith and with fair dealing:
Resource Management. 706 P.2d at 1038 (contract rights must be exercised
in reasonable manner and in goodfaith); Ted R. Brown. 753 P.2d at 970
( "every contract imposes a duty on the parties to exercise their contractual
rights and perform their contractual obligations reasonably"); Leigh
Furniture. 657 P.2d at 311 (party breaches covenant of goodfaith and fair
dealing if it fails to exercise all its rights under contract reasonably);..
This Court in 1993, defined substantial performance in the case of Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. Of Transportation. 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah, 1993):
Substantial performance exists "where there has been no willful
departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission in essential
points', and the contract has been honestly andfaithfully performed in its
material and substantial particulars. " Blacks Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed.
1979). A party has substantially performed when "the only variance from
the strict and literal performance consists of technical or unimportant
omissions or defects ". Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 858
P.2datl370.
Here there was a "willful departure from the terms of the contract" and it was
not "honestly and faithfully performed in its material and substantial particulars''
rather it was purposefully and intentionally breached: (a) by not purchasing the sign;
(b) waiting until the sign permits were illegal and then issuing permits which did not
even facially comply with the ordinance; (c) by the City passing an ordinance that
disallowed off-premise signs, and therefore the City thought it did not have to grant
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the priority to Defendant as expressly agreed, nor did they have to publish this
subject priority in the published sign policy. The official actions of the Plaintiff City
were not only willful but in direct violation of the covenant to act in good faith and
with fair dealing.
Defendant submits that it is entitled to rescission of the Stipulation, with the
matter be remanded to the District Court to determine damages in order to put the
Defendant back into the position where he was before the Stipulation was entered
into, and where that can not be accomplished, then the Defendant should be awarded
such damages as will fairly compensate him, including his attorney fees arising from
the Plaintiffs lack of good faith pursuctnt to Section 78-2-2, UCA.

II.
ARGUMENT TWO: APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS
THAT HE IS NOT ONLY ENTITLED TO RESCISSION, BUT IN ADDITION
THERETO HE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES THAT HE HAS SUSTAINED.
A.
Where There Is a Material Breach by the Plaintiff the Defendant Is Not
Required to Perform and the Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Bring an Action for the
Defendant to Perform.
Appellant claims a right to be made whole for the damages that he has
sustained in addition to the remedy of rescission. He claims that he is entitled to
those damages that he has sustained for having to remove certain signs, as well as a
voiding of the contract between the parties.
In the case of Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1979),
This Court stated on page 451 as follows:
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As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right to rescission and
an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where
there has been a material breach of contract by the other party.
In this action, it is clear that the Plaintiff breached the contract and agreement
as reflected in the Stipulation, regarding paragraph 1, for which the Court awarded
judgment to the Defendant in the amount of $3,890.00, as reflected in paragraph 1 of
the Decree:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
I.
Defendant is awardedjudgment against the Plaintiff in the amount
of~ $3,890.00 on account of Plaintiff's Default in failing to purchase a sign
from the Defendant. Defendant is awarded prejudgment interest from
January I, 1985 at the rate of 10% per annum.
Defendant submits that when the Plaintiff is the first to materially breach the
contract and agreement of the parties they are precluded from thereafter requiring
performance by the Defendant.
In the case Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp.. 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App.
1994) at page 301 in the following:
The law is well settled that the material breach by one party to a contract
excuses further performance by the nonbreaching part. See Sanders v.
Sharp. 840 P. 2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside Nursery.
787 P. 2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990). Also a party seeing to enforce a
contract must prove performance of its own obligations under the contract.
Malotv.Hadlev. 86 Or. App. 687, 740 P.2d 804, 805-806 (1987). See Bell
v. Elder. 782 P. 2d 545, 548 (Utah App. 1989). The jury concluded that
Holbrook fully performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreements.
In contract, Firemaster was found to have materially breached the
Franchise Agreement, thereby losing its right to enforce them against
Holbrook. As the Franchise Agreements specifically incorporated the
promissory notes, the notes are an integral part of the Franchise
Agreements. Therefore, given Firemaster's material breach, Holbrook was
properly excusedfrom continued payment on the promissory notes.
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In the case of Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), at page
157 is the following:
The substantial performance defense has been explained as follows: "As a
rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of a contract
cannot complaint if the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can
neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action
against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform. " Fernandez v.
Purdue. 30 Utah 2d 389, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (1974) (Ellett, J. Dissenting)
(quoting 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts Sec. 365). See Parr ell J. Diderickson &
Sons v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist.. 613 P. 2d 1116, 1119
(Utah, 1980); Wags taffy. Remco. Inc.. 540 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiff never had the right to file its motion to compel in 1986 or at any time
thereafter because they were already in material breach. Also note Jackson v. Rich.
499 P.2d 279 (Utah 1972).
Whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant were the first to breach the Stipulation
is not even at issue before this Court. It is clear that the Plaintiff was the first to
materially breach. The Defendant perfarmed as he was required to by providing
information sufficient for the Plaintiff 1o make its determination to purchase. That
decision was made when the Plaintiff signed the Stipulation on March 24, 1983.
Judge Noel confirmed that breach and awarded judgment against the Plaintiff and for
the Defendant in the sum of $3,890.00, plus 10% interest from January 1, 1985.
Once the Plaintiff failed and refused to perform its obligations under the
Stipulation, the Defendant was entitled to withhold performance, and in fact
eventually refused to perform, based upon the material breach by the Plaintiff.
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Notwithstanding, the breach by the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sought the Court to
force the Defendant to remove four (4) of the nine (9) signs, for which the Defendant
claims damages. (T-153.) The lower court erred when it granted the orders to
compel removal of the signs. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at page 157.

B.
The Facts When Marshalled Show That the Trial Court Abused its
Discretion When it Held the Defendant Did Not Prove Damages Because the
Facts Show That the Defendant Proved its Damages Without Any Refutation or
Objection by the Plaintiff.
Defendant acknowledges that the lower Court entered findings of fact, which
requires the Defendant to marshall all of the evidence, and then show that the same is
an abuse of discretion by the lower Court. Note Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087,
(UtahApp. 1995).
The lower Court made only one FINDING OF FACT, regarding the issue of
damages, which Counsel respectfully submits is really a CONCLUSION OF LAW,
but titled a FINDING OF FACT:
8.
Defendant has failed to prove any damages as a result of Plaintiffs
failure to timely issue sign permits, for issuing permits with a sign-specific
sequence for removal, or on account of Plaintiffs failure to publish
Defendant's "priority" for off premise signs along Interstate 80 because
such signs are unlawful under Plaintiff s present Zoning Ordinance.
Assuming that this Court finds this Conclusion of Law to really be a
FINDING OF FACT, Appellant will now marshall all of the evidence that supports
the same. This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript at page 1 through
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and including 57 line 9, as there was "no evidence" submitted during opening
argument.
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning on page 57
to 89 and 100 to 106, as during these parts of the testimony of Terry Christiansen, he
did not provide any evidence of damages.
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning on page
106 to and including page 203, where Defendant Lundgren was called by the
Plaintiff to testify, and he did not produce any evidence of damages during this part
of the said transcript.
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 204
to and including page 266, however excluding pages 227 and 245 where there is
evidence of damages.
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 294
to and including page 337, then from 339 to 358, then 360 to page 385 where there is
no evidence submitted by Mr. Lundgren regarding damages.
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 407
to and including page 418 and then from 420 to 432, as Denver Snuffer offered no
evidence of damages.
Defendant respectfully submits that the foregoing is a total and complete
marshaling of all of the evidence that supports the Findings/Conclusion that the
Defendant "failed to prove any damages".
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Appellant submits that the abuse of discretion occurs when one we looks to
the Transcript at page 90 through 100, where Terry Christiansen, explained that the
provision of the Stipulation were all material; page 227 where Mayor Johnson
testified regarding Exhibit 12, and how that established some evidence of value in
the signs and the same with page 245; page 338 to and including 348, where
Defendant admitted into evidence Exhibit 36, which showed all of his damages,
along with an explanation of how he arrived at the same; page 359 where the
Defendant testified regarding damages in having to get a Court Order to correct the
provision of Exhibit 12, where the Mayor incorrectly showed that the subject signs
come down according to his priority rather than the priority picked by the Defendant;
page 326 where Defendant Lundgren testified how the priority being published
would be of tremendous value to him even if the off-premise signs were made illegal
by the zoning change made by the Plaintiffs, coupled with page 329, where the
Defendant's name would be in the official sign policy and benefit the Defendant in
all kinds of signs; pages 386 to and including 407 where Defendant Lundgren was
being cross-examined by Plaintiff regarding is damages and Exhibit 36; page 419
where Denver Snuffer testified as to the value of being in the published sign policy
and lastly, pages 433 to and including 443, where the Defendant's expert witness
testified without any refutation or contradiction that each of the signs were valued at
$48,000.00 and the value of being in the published sign policy to be $40,000.00 for
each location.
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At page 438, expert witness Phillip Card testified to the following without
any dispute or challenge by the Plaintiff in any way:
Q.

Like you to look at Paragraph 13 for me if you would, please. And
I'll read it to you in case you can't see it from there.
"It is agreed and understood between the plaintiff and defendant that
if the plaintiff city issues sign permits in the future, the defendant by
virtue of its existing signs, will have apriority over any applicant who
does not have an existing sign. "

Could you give us some idea as to how valuable that may or may not be.
A.

Well, it would be very valuable, I would think.

Q.

And is there any possible way you could put a figure on that?

A.

Well, depends on the number, basically, but I would say $40,000.00
per location.

Q.

For location?

A.
Q.

Depending on the viewing of it.
Yeah. Let me go on. "And the plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps
are necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made a
part of the published sign policy of plaintiff city".
Have you ever seen a sign policy where somebody has apriority over
any person that doesn 't have an existing sign?

A.

No.

Q.

Would you be able to tell us whether or not that would be valuable to
the Defendant?

A.

Well, yeah. It eliminates the competition.

Q.

Can you put a price on (hat, particularly?

A.

Well, there again, it goes back to the 40 times the monthly billing. If
it works out that you can rent both sides versus one side, it depends.
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Defendant was forced to remove four signs valued at $48,000 each; was
denied the published priority which was valued at 40 times the sign monthly billing,
and the permits were valued at $40,000 each. The City did not dispute these figures
or present any opposing testimony, nor did it object to the testimony. In addition Mr.
Lundgren testified extensively as to his damages, also unrefuted.
This expert witness was uniquely qualified as an expert witness not just by
his experience in the sign industry for 33 years and the fact that he had been involved
in as many as 60 billboards. The one factor that made this witness so credible was
the fact that he was actually going to buy the signs in question the year before the
trial, and he had personally made a determination of the price he would pay for the
subject signs.
Appellant respectfully submits that it is clearly an abuse of discretion for the
lower Court to make a Finding/Conclusion that the "Defendant failed to prove any
damages..."

The record overwhelmingly refutes that Finding/Conclusion.

In this case the Plaintiff was the first to breach the contract, and therefore all
of the foregoing damages are compensable to the Defendant. Note Breuer-Harrison
v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990) and Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279 (Utah
1972).
//
//
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III.
ARGUMENT THREE: THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BASIS THAT
THE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANT WERE WITHOUT
MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH.
In this action, the lower Court made and entered FINDINGS OF FACT 11,
which states:
11.
Plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney 'sfees incurred in the
enforcement of the Stipulation for the period commencing September 16,
1989 through the trial of this matter, which was concluded August 15, 1995.
Plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees is based upon Title 78-27-56 UCA 1953,
as amended. That section provides, inter alia, that the Court shall aware
attorney 'sfees to a litigant in the prosecution of a claim if the defense
asserted by the opposing party is without merit and is asserted in bad faith.
By these proceedings, the Plaintiff has sought to enforce those provision of
the Stipulation which required removal of the signs required to be removed
in 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. The validity and enforceability of the
Stipulation was determined by the orders made by the Court in 1986 and
the Defendants Appeal from those orders was dismissed. The evidence in
the file in this case shows that there has not been a single instance after the
1986 Order and the dismissal of the Appeal in which the Defendant has
timely complied with the Stipulation which required removal of signs on
December 31, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993. Legal action was required in
each separate instance to enforce removal of the signs order to be removed
in 1987, 1989, 1993 and the sign to be removed by year end 1991 was not
removed until August or September 1992. Defendant has participated in
proceedings throughout as an attorney and/or litigant. The Court finds that
the claims and defenses asserted by the Defendant as a defense to his
failure to remove the signs are without merit and are not asserted in good
faith. The Court further finds that the reasonable amount of attorney 'sfees
incurred by the Plaintiff in the enforcement of the Stipulation from
September 6, 1989, through August 16, 1995, exclusive of those fees related
to securing the Order of Contempt as referred to in Paragraph 10 of these
Findings, is $16,843.00.
According to Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087 (Utah App. 1995), Appellant is
required to marshall all of the evidence in support of the subject FINDING, and then
show how the same is an abuse of discretion.
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In meeting this obligation, Appellant carefully reviewed the Transcript from
page 1 to 1666, and the record from 00001 to and including 1099, and no where in all
of these pages is there evidence that the Defendant at anytime claimed a defense that
was without merit or any defense that was not maintained in good faith.
Appellant submits that what is in fact called a FINDING OF FACT, is really
more a CONCLUSION OF LAW, as this Court is not given any facts or detail of
evidence that the lower Court observed at trial, rather all this Court is given in the
alleged FINDING OF FACT, is a conclusion that the Defendant has claimed all
along that Plaintiff has materially breached and therefore the Defendant need not
have to further comply with the Stipulation, and that claim/defense is without merit
and not asserted in good faith.
Defendant claims that once the Plaintiff City failed to purchase the sign they
agreed to in 1983, he then was excused from any further requirements of the
Stipulation.
According to Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), the issue of
"without merit" is a question of law, and reviewed for correctness, whereas the "bad
faith" is a question of fact reviewed on the basis of an abuse of discretion. Baldwin
v. Burton. 850 P.2d at 1199. Note Topik v. Thurber. 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987) and
also Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
According to Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) to meet the
"without merit" prong, Plaintiff would have had to show that the defenses of the
Defendant, were "frivolous" and "of little weight or importance having no basis in
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law or fact". To meet the "lack of good faith" prong, the Plaintiff would have had to
show that the defense of the Defendant was not based on:
"(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no
intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, (sic) hinder, delay
or defraud others ". Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d at 151.
In Cady this Court drives home a critical point of law and logic, and this is
before one looks at the application of 78-27-56, one must be the prevailing party.
Here, the lower Court held in favor of the Defendant on the basis that the
Plaintiff had breached the contract and agreement of the parties as reflected in the
Stipulation. As a matter of law and as a matter of logic, Appellant respectfully
submits, that the Court can not on the one hand say that the claim is without merit
and not asserted in good faith; and then on the other hand grant judgment on the
claim. Defendant was a prevailing party on the claim of breach by failure to
purchase. The Plaintiff was excused for its other failures to perform, but cannot be
construed as a prevailing party. It is totally illogical that Plaintiff should be granted
attorney fees for Defendant's unmeritorious defense, when the Defendant prevailed.
Even if Defendant did not prevail, as in the case of Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), this Court stated:
A party may bring a goodfaith action and not prevail. Failure of the cause
of action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to pay
costs. If we were to adopt such an approach, parties who had difficult but
valid claims would be economically precluded from bringing suit. Watkiss
& Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d at 1067-1068.
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Even if this Court were to agree with the lower Court that the defenses of the
Defendant were without merit and not asserted in good faith, this Court would still
have to reverse the lower Court on inadequate findings. Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d
202 (Utah App. 1991).
Appellant respectfully submits that he prevailed on his defense, but even if he
had not it was clearly maintained in good faith and had merit; therefore, this Court
should reverse the award of attorney's fees ordered by the lower Court.
If any party is guilty of maintaining an action which is subjects the other
party to attorney fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 (UCA 1953), it is the actions of
the Plaintiff. The Defendant requested such damages, but they were not granted by
the trial court. This Court should rectify that error and also grant the Defendant its
attorney fees.

CONCLUSION
The most compelling fact, that the Appellants feel is dispositive in this action, is
not even in dispute. Arguments One, Two and Three all hinge on this one fact, and if this
one fact is true, then the Court could appropriately reverse on each of the three arguments.
That fact is that Coalville City materially breached the contract and agreement in reference
to Paragraph 1, in the Stipulation.

If that one fact is true, and it is not disputed on appeal

by the Plaintiff Coalville City, then Appellants Argument One is well taken, and he is
entitled to rescission and reversal of the attorney fees award to the Plaintiff.
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The case law is clear that the non-breaching party need do nothing further, once the
breaching party has materially breached the contract and agreement. Hence, no signs
should have come down, no attorneys fees should have been awarded to the Plaintiff.
Cross Appellant does not even attempt to challenge the fact that Plaintiff Coalville
City was the first to breach the contract. Coalville City does not challenge their own
official minutes which state that they had passed a resolution to buy the sign contemplated
in the Stipulation, and then failed to make the purchase.
Furthermore, Coalville City does not challenge the testimony of Terry Christiansen,
who testified that Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff either lease or purchase, and that it
was material to the Defendant, and that the City never at any time perform as they had
agreed.
Furthermore, Coalville City does not challenge the testimony of Mayor Johnson,
who testified that Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff City, either buy or lease, and the
City passed on official resolution to purchase a sign, and that the City never at anytime
performed as they agreed.
Every other witness, other than Phillip Card, who was the Defendant's expert
witness on damages, testified that it was material to the Defendant; that the Defendant
insisted that the purchase clause be in the agreement, and that the Plaintiff City never at
anytime performed as they had agreed.
Hence, the reason that Cross Appellant Coalville City, does not even attempt to
appeal the determination by the lower Court that they had materially breached the
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Stipulation between the parties, in failing to purchase the sign as they had agreed, is that
there is no evidence to the contrary.
Appellant respectfully submits that once this determination was made by the lower
Court, then everything else that he asks this Court to do naturally flows from therefrom.
The other material breaches by the Plaintiff only support and confirm that the Defendant is
entitled to recission and damages.
Appellant asks for rescission and rescission is appropriate. The value of having
Coalville City purchase the sign from the Defendant meant much more to him than merely
the money involved. That which was so meaningful and valuable to the Defendant was the
public use and therefore the official endorsement by the City of his signs. That would be
good not only for public relations and future business, but it creates an endorsement of
having billboards in the area. This 'foot in the door' for the Defendant was particularly
further enhanced by the granting of the official priority and the publication in the official
sign policy.
Plaintiff encouraged the lower Court to narrowly look at these intentional breaches,
stating if the Defendant is not out anything since the billboards are no longer allowed. The
obvious problem with this analysis is that it completely overlooks the benefits to the
Defendants for signs other than billboards, as he testified to on pages 326 and 329. Such
value, going on into perpetuity, was astronomical. It also overlooks the incredible value of
the publicity and prestige of having Defendant's name listed as a priority for the granting
of permits in an official policy of the City.
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Once the Plaintiff Coalville City breached the Defendant was no longer required to
perform and was entitled to rescission. He is also entitled to be restored to where he was
before the contract and agreement was breached, hence Argument Two, compensatory
damages where straight rescission is insufficient to restore the Defendant to his preStipulation position.
The Finding/Conclusion stating "Defendant has failed to prove any damages. . ." is
not supported at all in the record. It is critical for this Court to note that the
Finding/Conclusion does not say this evidence is insufficient or for whatever reason the
evidence was not acceptable, rather the Finding/Conclusion states that there was none, and
as this Court can see from the transcript, there was not only substantial evidence regarding
damages, but the testimony regarding damages was not contradicted or refuted in anyway.
Mr. Lundgren even sustained damages in correcting Exhibit 12, the bogus permits,
to establish that the signs would be allowed to stay under Defendant's own pattern of
removal, not what was expressly put on the permit by the Mayor. This cost the Defendant
attorneys fees, critical down time in being able to sell and/or market his signs.
Furthermore, the defective permits caused significant problems with the Defendant's
security in the Stipulation, since the language in paragraph 10 required that the signs come
down for which he did not have a permit. Hence, the Defendant sustained significant
damages in just getting this problem removed, years after it was to have happened in the
first place, i.e.: 1983 to approximately 1989.
The Zoning Administrator was to issue sign permits, the Mayor did not have that
authority. Ironically, Mayor Johnson was the Mayor at the time of the lawsuit was filed,
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and he was the one that insisted the signs come down, because the Defendant did not have
valid permits according to the zoning ordinance. Yet this exact same Mayor testified that
he waited specifically until the new zoning ordinance went into effect before he issued the
sign permits. His intentionally delay, made his own actions unlawful, as any "delegated
representative" could issue permission before the new ordinance, however, only the Zoning
Administrator could issue permits afterwards. Indeed, the new zoning ordinance would not
allow the permits to be validly issued since it prohibited off-premises signs, the very type
of signs for which the Mayor issued permits. When the Mayor got around to issuing the
permits, not only was he not authorized, the ordinance prohibited the issuance of the
permits, making them void ab initio.
Perhaps the most troubling part of the lower Court's ruling is that since the zoning
ordinance prohibits billboards, the Defendant is not entitled to the published preference, his
'quid pro quo.' The patent unfairness of the Plaintiffs action, is that the Plaintiff City
created the basis for their nonperformance. They themselves, passed the ordinance that did
away with the quid pro quo for the Defendant. This selfserving act is manifest bad faith.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower Court on the issue
of rescission, remand with instructions to award damages to the Defendant to make him
whole, based on the evidence already adduced by the parties, and completely reverse the
lower Court on the granting of attorneys fees to the Plaintiff. The Appellant further request
that this Court instruct the lower court to find that the Plaintiff acted in bad faith and that
the Plaintiff should reimburse the Defendant for his attorney fees.
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Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 1996
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IS THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COALVILLE CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, dba
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
et al.,
Defendants.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 82-039-6856
Judge Frank Noel
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This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on August 15, 1995 commencing at 8:30 o'clock
a.m. The Plaintiff, Coalville City was represented by its
attorneys, Grant Macfarlane, James L. Barker and Kira E. Macfarlane. The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney, John
Walsh.
The Court has heretofore directed that all pending petitions , motions, orders to show cause and other pleadings and
unresolved issues in this matter be heard by the Court in an
evidentiary hearing and that such matters be adjudicated by the
Court and disposed of by a Decree to be entered in this cause.
The unresolved claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are
set forth in Plaintiff's Verified Petition, dated February 19,
1990; in Plaintiff's Motion dated March 29, 1990 based upon the
Verified Petition of February 19, 1990 and in Plaintiff's Verified Petition dated August 29, 1994. The claims asserted by the
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Defendant are set forth in Iris Verified Petition dated August 29,
1994 and in various other motions, pleadings and memoranda
heretofore filed by the Defendant in this cause.
The matter was tried to the Court on August 15 and 16. Each
of the parties adduced evidence in support of their various
claims and in defense of claims asserted by the other. Upon conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing the pending
matters were argued to the Court by counsel for the respective
parties and thereupon submitted to the Court for decision. The
Court being fully advised in the premises now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. ALVIN-R. LUNDGREN, (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant") r wasthe sole shareholder and managing officer of ALL
ASSOCIATES, INC., the original defendant in this cause. All
Associates, Inc. was dissolved in 1986 and its assets were transferred to the Defendant including the advertising signs hereinafter referred to. The Defendant has heretofore entered his
personal appearance and has been substituted as the Defendant in
this cause.
2. Under date of March 23, 1983 the parties entered into a
Stipulation (herein referred to as "the Stipulation") compromising and settling the issues raised by the pleadings heretofore
filed by the parties. The Stipulation was submitted to and
approved by the Court by Order dated April 5, 1983.
3. At the time the Stipulation was entered into, Defendant
had constructed and was maintaining nine (9) billboard advertising signs along Interstate Highway 80 within the Coalville City
limits. The Stipulation required Plaintiff to issue a permit for
each of the Defendant's nine signs, provided that one of each of
such permits should expire on December 31, 1985, 1987, 1989,
1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997, and that two of such permits should
expire December 31, 2001.
4. The Stipulation required the Defendant to remove one
sign of his choosing each time a permit expired. Sign permits
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Mere issued by the City prior to fihe removal of the first sign
removed by the Defendant. While the permits on their face show
that the Defendant was required to remove his signs in a certain
sequence, the facts, including Orders entered by the Court, show
that the Defendant was and is entitled to and has selected the
sequence in which each sign was removed.
5. The sign permits issued to the Defendant as provided for
and interpreted by orders of the Court herein create valid and
enforceable rights and obligations as contemplated by the Stipulation. Plaintiff has never challenged the validity of the
permits and Defendant has presented no evidence which 'THOWI
the permits are 'invalid or unenf orceab I e,,
6
The Stipulation (Paragraph 13) requires the Plaintiff to
'grant to the Defendant a priority in the event permits for
certain' signs were issued by the Plaintiff after the Stipulation
was entered into. Plaintiff was further required to publish this
priority in the "Published Sign Policy" of the Plaintiff City.
Plaintiff contends that the priority referred to ::i m the Stipuiatiion pertained only to "off-premises" signs which might thereafter be located along Interstate 80 within the Coalville City
limits. Defendant contends that the priority pertained to r]\
sign permits issued by the City after the date of the Stipulation, whether on ox off premises signs, and regardless of where
located within the Ci try limi t s . "Off-premises s i g n s " are advertising signs w h i c h ar e n o t located on th e business premises of
the advertiser. Converse] y, " o n - p r e m i s e s " signs a x e signs
located o n the business p r e m i s e s o f the advertiser. T h e Court
heard evidence from t h e p a r t i e s a n d from the attorneys w h o
assisted in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n a n d preparation o f t h e Stipulation.
From the language of t h e S t i p u l a t i o n a n d t h e testimony of the
various w i t n e s s e s 4 t h e Court finds that 1 t wa s intended b y the
parties and b y t h e Stipuiati on that the priority referred to in
Paragraph 13 o f ^the A g r e e m e n t p e r t a i n only t:< i off-premises signs
which,may-be located along Interstate 80 w i t h i n t h e Coalville
City l i m i t s f r o m a n d after t h e date of the S t i p u l a t i o n .
I^da5fe^*^*l»tif f h a s n o t issued a n y sign permits for the
-3n no99£

construction of off-premises signs on Interstate 80 since the
date of the Stipulation. The Plaintiff did not publish the
Defendant's priority for off-premises advertising signs along
Interstate 80. Since the date of the Stipulation, Plaintiff has
passed an Ordinance making it: illegal to construct off-premises
signs . Nothing in the Stipulation prevented the City from
adopting such an Ordinance.
8. Defendant has failed to prove any damages as a result of
Plaintiff's failure to timely issue sign permits* for issuing:
permits with a sign-specific sequence for* removal, or on account
of Plaintiff's failure to publish Defendant's "priority" in a
published Sign Policy. No useful purpose would be served by
requiring Plaintiff ta_publish Defendant-'s-priority—for- o££premises signs along Interstate 80 because such signs are unlawful under Plaintiff's present Zoning Ordinance.
9. Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation requires Plaintiff to
purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant at the Defendant's
cost, not to exceed $5,200 in the event of a purchase. No time
for performance of this obligation was set forth in the Stipulation. No request or demand for the purchase or lease of a sign
was made by Defendant for several years after the Stipulation was
entered into. Rather, Defendant took the position that the
Stipulation was unenforceable and has maintained that position
right up to and during the trial of this case. Plaintiff takes
the position that the purchase of a sign by the Coalville City
Chamber of Commerce satisfied the purpose and intent of Paragraph
1 of the Stipulation which required Coalville City to lease or
purchase a sign from the Defendant. The Court finds from the
evidence that thePlaintiff is in default in its obligation to
purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant. The Defendant did
not furnish an itemization of costs required by Paragraph 1 of
the Stipulation within 60 days after signing of the Stipulation.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Defendant has sustained
damages in the amount of $3,890 on account of the default of
Plaintiff in failing to purchase the sign. Interest shall accrue
on the.damage award from January 1, 1985 to present at 10Z per
annum.

-. ±at±£f
h a s filed a Verified Petition in this cause
alleging that the Defendant is in contempt of Court for wi llful
disobedience of an Order of the Court issued in these proceedings
under date of September 6, 1989 By that Order, the Court
specifically directed "that the sign bearing advertising for
Coalville City shall n~_ ae removed as one of the signs referred
to- herein or in "the Jurigjiwrnt"
The Coux t heard evidence in
support of and in opposition to the Plaintiff's 'Petition for a
judgment of contempt. T h e Coxir't finds from, 'the evidence that.- i n
December of 1989 the Defendant personally removed the sign
bearing advert is i ng for Coalville City; that at the time of the
removal of ^ p sign the Defendant h a d knowledge of the Court's
Order; that
tinder stood th e Order.;-, that h e k n e w that removal of
t j i e s £g„ n w a a a V j L oi a tion of the Order and, therefore, that
Defendant knowingly and willfu 1 1 y v I olated the sai d Order and is
therefore in contempt of Cour t. In pla ce of any fine or imprisonment which the Court might impose for the contempt, the Court
has determined that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to
Plaintiff the costs and fees incurred by Plaintiff in securing
the Contempt Order. Based upon Affidavits submitted by counsel
at the direction of the Court, the Court finds that the reasonable fees incurred by Plaintiff I n securing the Contempt Order
are in the amount of $3,542.
]1
Plaintiff seeks reco vex y of attox ne^ ' ' s fees incur r ei i i ici
the e n f o r c e m e n t o f the S t i p u l a t i o n for the p e r i o d commencing
September 6, 1939, through the trial of this matter which was
concluded August 1 6 , 1995. Plaintiff's c La i m for attorney's fees
is based upon Title 78-27-56 U C A 1953, as amended. That section
provides, inter alia, that the Court shall award attorney's fees
to a litigant in the prosecution o f a claim if the defense
asserted by the opposing party is without merit and is asserted
in bad faith. By these proceedings, the Plaintiff has sought to
enforce those prov i si OILS of the Stipulation which required
removal of the signs required to b e removed in 1987, 1 9^3
and 1993,, The validity and enforceability of the Stipulation was
determined by orders made W the Court In II "iliifi ,ui<i the Defendants

00099*

Appeal from those orders was dismissed. The evidence in the file
in this case shows that there has not been a single instance
after the 1986 Order and the dismissal of the Appeal in which the
Defendant has timely complied with the Stipulation which required
removal of signs on December 31, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993.
Legal action was required in each separate instance to enforce
removal of the signs ordered to be removed in 1987,. 1989 and 1993
and the sign to be removed by year end 1991 was not removed rmtil
August or September 1992. Defendant, has participated ixr the
proceedings throughout as an attorney and/or litigants The Court
finds that the claims and defenses asserted by the Defendant as a
defense to his failure to remove the signs are without merit and
are not asserted in good faith. The Court further finds that the
reasonable amount of"attorneyhs fees incurred"by Plaintiff in the
enforcement of the Stipulation from September 6, 1989, through
August 16, 1995, exclusive of those fees related to securing the
Order of Contempt as referred to in Paragraph 10 of these Find-

ings, is $/^/%/5'<Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Stipulation is valid and enforceable. There has
been no material breach of the Stipulation on the part of Plaintiff. Defendant is not entitled to rescind the Stipulation.
Defaults on the part of the Plaintiff in failing to timely issue
sign permits; in issuing permits which provided for sign-specific
sequencing for removal; and in failing to publish Defendant's
priority for off-premises signs along Interstate 80 are not
material breaches of the Stipulation in that Defendant has proved
no damages resulting from any such breach. Plaintiff's default
in failing to purchase a sign from the Defendant resulted in
damages in the amount of $3,890 and the default can be remedied
by the award of damages, and therefore does not go to the consideration for the Stipulation and is not sufficient to justify
rescission.

oooaso

2. Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaint iff
in the amount f $3,890 on account of Plaintiff's default in the
purchase of a ' ^ " TTT Defendant. Interest should accrue an
this award from January " 1 985 at the rate of 101 per annum.
3* Defendant ::i s not entitled to Ltie equitable relief of
rescission in any event because he does not come before the Court
with "clean hands" in that he has repeatedly violated the terms
of the Stipulation and is in contempt of Court for willful
disobedience of a direct order of the Court in these proceedings.
4. Defendant is not entitled i< the equitable relief of
rescission in any event for the reasc that Defendant fai Led to
give timely notice of rescission and tender ; *-:r^ f consideratrLoir~received-and-further becaus e it i s imposrs ib i e to res tore the
parties to the position they were . = ^ .
to entering into the
Stipulation, the Defendant having maintained the advertising
signs pursuant uu the Stipulation foi a period of approximately
12 years.
""i, ihe sign permits issued to the Defendant as provided for
and interpreted by orders of the Court herein create valid and
enforceable right
uu obligations as contemplated by the Stipulation.
6
Defendant is in contempt of Cour t for willful disobedience of the Court's Order entered September 6, 1989 and should
be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the reasonable and necessary fees
incurred by Plaintiff I n securi ng the Contempt Order which fees
are in the amount of $3^542.
7. The Defendant is in default under ,
terms of the
Stipulation by his failure 1; u remove the sign required to be
removed December 31, 1993 and the Court should order .:he Defendant to remove the sign within 60 days from the ^atc of the Decree
to be entered in this matter.
8. The priority referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Stipulation relates only to off-premises signs Located along Interstate
80 within the Coalville City limits. No further order should be
made with respect to publication of Defendant1^ priority rights

-7-

for such off-premises signs because the same are illegal under
the City's present Zoning Ordinance*
9. Plaintiff should beawarded Judgment against Defendant
in the amount of $/u7 /flMr O for attorney's fees incurred by
Plaintiff, exclusive of the fees referred to in Paragraph 5 in
the enforcement of the Stimulation.
7 18* "Any relief sought ib^elther party *hich is not disposed
of by the Decree entered pursuant to the foregoing Findings of
Fact. and~Conc lusions of Law should be denied.
aiedj
MADE AHD ENTERED this ^Mr^ Gar o f ^ g A j
» 1995-

0t

*

Igl

l^\ COUNTY j y
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GRAHT HACFARLANE, JR. (#2040)
JJHES L - BARKER (#0205)
KIRA E . MACFARLANE (#7081)
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
The Reid Bn-f Iriing
750 E . Kearns B l v d . , S u i t e 212
P . O^Box 680106
P a r k J d t j , Utah^S4Q68-Q106
Telegfeoner
(801> 649-2014

OCT 2 6 1995

BS^THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT CODNTT
STATE 01-" UTAH
COALVILLE CITY,
Plaintiff,
DECREE
vs.
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, dba
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
et al.,

C i v i l No. 82-039-6856
J u d g e Frank Noel

Defendants.
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on August 15, 1995 commencing at 8:30 o'clock
a.m. The Plaintiff, Coalville City was represented by its
attorneys, Grant Macfarlane, James L. Barker and Kira E. Macfarlane. The Defendant appeared in per;.~r and by his attorney, John
Walsh.
The Court has heretofore directed that all pending petitions, motions, orders to show cause and other pleadings and
unresolved issues in this matter be heard by the Court in an
evidentiary hearing and that such matters be adjudicated by the
Court and disposed of by a Decree to be entered in this cause.
The unresolved claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are
set forth in Plaintiff's Verified Petition, dated February 19,
1990; in Plaintiff's Motion dated March 29, 1990 based upon the
Verified Petition of February 19, 1990 and in Plaintiff's Verified Petition dated August 29, 1994. The claims asserted by the

BOOKUUMfiEO'67
000993
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Defendant are set forth in his Verified "Petition dated itiogsct 29,
1994 and in various other motions, pleadings and memoranda.
heretofore filed by the Defendant in this cause.
The matter was tried to the Court on August 15 and 16, 'Each
of the parties adduced evidence in support of their various
claims and in defense of claims asserted by .the other, upon
elusion of the evidentiary portion of the lw^arf-ng the pending
matters were argued to the Court by counsel for the respective*
parties and thereupon submitted to the Court: £or decision* *
_
Court being fuiiy advised in the premises and having heretofore
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Coneiusions of Law,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS^
1. Defendant is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff in the
amount of $3,890 on account of Plaintiff's Default in failing to
purchase a sign from Defendant, Defendant is awarded prejudgment
interest from January 1, 1985 at the rate of 10Z per annum.
2. Defendant is Adjudged to be in Contempt of Court for
willful disobedience of the Court's Order entered September 6,
1989. In lieu of fine, imprisonment or other sanctions, the
Court orders that Plaintiff be and it is hereby awarded Judgment
against Defendant in the amount of $3,542 for Plaintiff's reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in
securing the Contempt Order.
3. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendant in the
amount of $ /ffi/ J^fj "^for reasonable and necessary attorney's
fees incurred by Plaintiff in the enforcement of the Stipulation
and Orders of the Court herein, said amount being in addition to
the fees awarded by Paragraph 2 of this Decree.
4. The Defendant is ordered to remove one additional sign
within sixty (60) days from the date of this Decree representing
the sign required to be removed December 31, 1993.
5. It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the "priority"
referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Stipulation dated March 23,
1983, and approved by the Court April 5, 1983, relates only to

wartj-entt o 68

r\ r\ i~\ d Q 3i

"off-premises" signs located along Interest HII wxthin the
Coalville City limits.
f\
Any relief heretofore sought bv pending pleadings of
either party which i <3 not disposed of b-" the provisions of thi
Decree is denied.
7^*•-, V
MaDE AHD EHTEKED this JH£/day
of ^ ^ X . ____, 1995
BT THE CODET-

****M

B00Kl)0MffiO69
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
DAY, BARNEY & TYCKSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 8 4107
Telephone! (801) 262-6800
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COALVILLE CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
r

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

:

ALL ASSOCIATES, INC*

:

Defendant.

:

Civil Number:

6856

COME NOW the Plaintiff and Defendant in"the above-captione<
case and, pursuant to the agreement set forth below, stipulate
dismiss this cause of action with prejudice, and respectfully
request that the Court enter judgment to that effect,

J?he

agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, pursuant to whici
this stipulated dismissal is being taken, is as follows;
1.

With-in thirty (30) days from the date hereof, Defendan

agrees to provide Plaintiff a written bid for providing a paint
sign face for Coalville City at Plaintiff f s cost, the design of
which shall be agreed upon between the parties.

Within said

thirty day period, Defendant shall also supply Plaintiff with a

necessary cost information to enable Plaintiff v.o choose bet
leasing or purchas:

> -.. subject: sign.

determines to either

i

When Plaintiff

r urchase the sign, Defendant agrees

to provide a , • .- I i mi

days a£te

notification by Defendant

proceed*

Said sign face is to be

erected at Defendant s
day period at any one of Defendant's

line present sign locations.

• However, when the current lease agreement expires between
i\h o i i

D e f e n d a i 11, a i i ciil B 1 31 1 y ' s.. C ::: •' : :i i i "I

than February, 1984), Defendant agrees to immediately move, at nc

cost to plaintiff, tac sig- f n ^ constructed fen; IP I , i i n 1" 1 f f' I
locations currently occupied
which location is known
c •. " J =!'

Billy's Country Music Emporium,
Associates sign location number

If 1 J! c i :i • ,1 ::: :i f f i: •

a s = \ r atl ie* : t: ,1: lan lease th

face, Plaintiff will be solely responsible to maintain the sign
face and will In • i1 i n I i mancial obligation f

Defendar J

cost of purchase w *, 1 1 not exceed ^1^,21)0, M n i
structure.

Tl: =! •

- sign

After the expiration of A 1 1 Associates1 lease with

t

I l

I 1 I "! I l l l l

II I I " «,i

'in I 1 1 I I

I, i

IlI

I 13

erected # Plaintiff may extend the lease al*. I t s cost with .1
obligation to Defendant for t he continued and indefinite use of
t I ni

I ni mi 1: (is • c 11: 1
:

The P l a i n t i f f

s:::!: gi 1 fa ::: i-is :i

xected .

agrees to 1 ssue • one sign permit

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain

-2-

f fid

of 1985.
3.

The P l a i n t i f f

agrees to i s s u e one s i g n permit t o the

Defendant p e r m i t t i n g t h e Defendant to r e t a i n a sign u n t i l the e
of 1987.
4.

The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the e
of 1989.
5.

That P l a i n t i f f

agrees t o i s s u e one s i g n permit t o the

Defendant permit tingJIthe^Def end ant -to retain- a sifln u n t i l the e
of 1991.
6. The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the <
of 1993.
7.

The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the .
of 1995.
8.

The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the
of 1997.
9.

The Plaintiff agrees to issue two sign permits to the

Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain two signs until t
end of 2001.
10.

I t i s agreed and understood between the P l a i n t i f f anc

t h e Defendant t h a t t h e Defendant w i l l remove signs for which t
3-

Defendant does not have a p e r m i t , on or before the e x p i r a t i o n of
the permit period t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e weather condit i o n s in C o a l v i l l e , Utah.
11 •

I t i s agreed and understood between t h e P l a i n t i f f and

the Defendant t h a t p r i o r t o the e x p i r a t i o n of any of the Defend a n t ' s p e r m i t s , t h e Defendant may apply t o t h e P l a i n t i f f , t o have
any such permit renewed for a period of time agreed upon between
the P l a i n t i f f and Defendant*
12. ~ I t ~ i s agreed~~and~ understood t h a t t h e Defendant may applj
the permits granted h e r e i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g s i g n s t r u c t u r e s and
l o c a t i o n s i n d i v i d u a l l y as t h e Defendant deems a p p r o p r i a t e , and
t h a t the P l a i n t i f f w i l l not c o n t r o l which permit i s applied t o
which s i g n .
13.

I t i s agreed and understood between t h e P l a i n t i f f and

Defendant t h a t if the P l a i n t i f f City i s s u e s s i g n permits in the
f u t u r e , t h e Defendant, by v i r t u e of i t s e x i s t i n g s i g n s , w i l l have
a p r i o r i t y over any a p p l i c a n t who does not have an e x i s t i n g s i g n ,
and the P l a i n t i f f agrees t o take whatever s t e p s are necessary to
insure t h a t t h i s p r i o r i t y for e x i s t i n g s i g n s i s made a p a r t of
the published sign p o l i c y of the P l a i n t i f f
DATED t h i s

$*f

day of

City.

y

/Y%^<Zrf

By Mer£yn JdWnson

19 8_-3.

/

-4

'

—>
•>

L . \CHRISTXSWSEN,
\CHR;
TERRY L_

DATED

/

ney coxtor Plaintiff
Attorney

G4U
ALL ASSOCIATES^ I N C . ,

afufejs

DATED

By A l L u n d g r e n

Qatw 7-1. Kite

7

JXEMVER C^^SJKJFRJJRy JR.

Attorney for Defendant;

DATED

O R D E R

The foregoing S t i p u l a t i o n i s approved by the Court, and the
above-captioned m a t t e r i s hereby, dismissed w i t h prejudice.
DATED t h i s

^ i £ ^ a y of

Jfy/

19 8 ^ .

y^ssry
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AFPLICATIGii FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0- Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

D*cad

February 26, 1985

Alvin EL» Lundgroir
Address

Expires

All Associates^ Inc-

Ig69 Siesta TJrfve
Sandy, Utah

84092

John Hobson Property on past Strip nf T-ftn

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

14' x 43'

Description

„

Cost of Sign

Approved By 'rfffii*<&^
Date Paid

Remarks:

Decemoer 31. 2001

Permit Amount

/t^*^~#fa^^

Title

$16.00

^ ^ 5 ^ 7

Receipt No.

D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated

February 26, 1985

Expires

Name

Alvln-sr Lundgrotl

Address

1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

12-31-85

All Associates;"Inc.

84092

Sign-Placement Address

C. B. Copley Property Along- 1-80

I 4 , x 48'

Dimensions
Description

Cost of Sign

Approved

Date Paid

Remarks \

By

Permit Amount
/

/V^^^^

$16.00

V

T

'

Receipt No.

^
T)^UU^

APPLICATION FOE SIGN PEBMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated

February 26, 1985

Expires

Name

Alvin R. Lundgron

Address

1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

14

All Associates,Inc.

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

12-31-97

Thomas Copley Walker Property on East Side of 1-80

' x 48'

Description

Cost of Sign

Approved By
Date Paid

Remarks:

Permit Amount

tf^^dL.

.<f£~&*tt^2*<rr

$16,00

^ Title
Receipt No.

yJCy^^r
«P^
D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated February 26. 1985
Name

Expires

Alvin ft> Lundgron

12-31-93

All Associates; Ine^

Address 1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

14

' *

Description

Thomas Copley Walker property on West Side of 1-80

48<

__

Cost of Sign

Permit Amount

$16.00

Approved By /sfe*?££U,

^C^&^^Z"0*

Title

Date Paid

_

Receipt No.

Remarks:

s^&Csr+y
D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated

February 26, 1985

Name

Alvfn R. Lundgron

Address

1869'Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

12-31-95

All Associates, Inc.

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

Expires

Clarence Keves Property on Wesr Side of T-fiO

14' x 48'

Description

Cost of Sign

Approved
Date Paid

Remarks:

Permit Amount

$16.00

.,-^^^. ^ ^ ^ C - t i d e
Receipt No.

^Z<~+D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Paced February 26, 1985

Expires

Name

Alvin R. Lundgron

Address

1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

All Associates. Inc.

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

TW„mh OT - 7i

Clarence Keves Property on E^r Sin* «f T-fln

l 4 ' * 48'

Description

Cost of Sign

Permit Amount

Approved By
Date Paid

Remarks i

tie
~

$16.00
y ^ y ^ ^ r ^

Receipt No.

D5443

mm

APPLICATION FOK 2>1W
rt*nn
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated

February 26, 1985

Name
Address

Expires

Alvin R. Lundgron

12-31-89

All Associates, Inc.

1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

Clarence Keyes Property on West Side of 1-80

14* x 48T

Description

Cost of Sign

Date Paid

Remarks!

Permit Amount

./_

Receipt No.

$16.00

D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

Dated

February 26, 1985

Alvin R. Lundgron

Name
Address

Ex

Pires

12-31-91

All Associates, Inc.

1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

84092

Sign Placement Address

Dimensions

14>

John Hobson prnpgrfy nn Fact- R i ^ of T_an

* 48'

Description

Cost of Sign

Approved By y^ffls^^f^isi^^^*^^^r^^<4k*^l*•

Date Paid

fifarks T

Permit Amount

$16,00

t *e
Receipt No.

^Y
D5443

APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT
Coalville City
P. 0. Box 188
Coalville, Utah 84017

d

February 26. 1985

j

Alvin R. Lundgron

Expires

.Z-Zl-S'

All Associates, Inc.

rcss 1869 Siesta Drive
Sandy, Utah

84092

n Placement Address

oensions

John F. Hobson Property on West Side of 1-80

14' x 48'

scription

>st of Sign

PP"ved By yTA^T^C^U,
ate Paid

Remarks:

Permit Amount

^ ^ ^ ^ < 7 ^ ^ ? i t le
Receipt No.

$16 .00

^ZZg,^?
D5443

•Aarcr. >,

'tj
:nac

'lonnv 'tcu-ro

"!v: : c n ;
•v ^:i"
-^^•;..:,.
_-;.;n..

•:

te LS u g a m s c Che new I n d u s t r i a l Zoning iiong

• . :-^.."..'i ; a n : e a _ J -enow If : n e z o n i n g vouia oe vocea ;.n
. T.*r>r : ; K . ;nac ~:ie J i t v C o u n c i l w i l l nave a s p e c i a l
. "T : ;r j : ; a u : n e r e j r a ; n i v t n r e e Jounciimemoers .ier =
-«";..- .•->. ; e s ; :c lave .: * L ^ r e s e n c .

ViLliam M.. ,'uaa Tiencianea - h a t ne a p p r e c i a t e a t h e s e p e o p l e coming oaz
zo lee -is new now i n e v f e e i .
He s a i d he c a n ' r s e e wnv i t c a n ' t be
zoned t o f i t che^r n e e d s .
A s p e c i a l , m e e t i n g w i l l be h e l d on Thursday, March 2 4 , 1983 a t 7:30 p.a.
At t h i s t i m e , t h e r e w i l l be a s h o r t d i s c u * « i o n on the new proposed zoning
o r d i n a n c e b e f o r e i t i s p a s s e d . They are i n v i t e d to a t t e n d i f they wane
to.
Meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.

,'-'. '"'-

Recorder

SPECIAL MEETING HELD
This meeting is being held in the old court room, Summit County Court
House, 60 North Main.
Mayor Merlyu w. Johnson caLled the meeting to order at 7:30 p.m.
Councilmerabers present were Grant Geary, Russell S. Judd, William M.
Judd and Colleen R. Sargent with Gerald D. Ball absent due to work
schedule. Also present were Violet V. Judd, Treasurer; Wendy D. Richias,
Recorder; Terry Christianson, City Attorney; Stan Strebel and Jerry Saita,
County Planning Commission; L. Craig Vernon, Robert K. Banz, Dennis Wright,Board of Adjustments; Woodrow Nielson, Edwin L. Judd, and Lafe Bowen, Planning Commission.
Others in attendance were:
Business (if

Name
Boyd E. Willoughby
Jim Blonquist
Phyllis Smith - - _ - _ ^ __
Mrs. Richard Aoki
Frank W. Moore- - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - Bob Willoughby
Thomas W.. Moore - - - - - - - - - - - . * . Marcie Palmer
Roger Palmer
- - - - - - - - - - - ~ ^ « «
Blair E. Blonquist
Leon Simister - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ^ « George Wallace
E. Louise Wallace
J. Rose Wallace
Sharla Banz - - - - - - - - - - - - - . » « _
Dwain Clark
R. R. Toxtnan
- - - - - - - - - - - - « « .
Ed Ercanbrack
Blaine C. Blonquist
Afton W. Blonquist
Gertrude Willoughby - - - - - - - - - • - .
Helen Blonquist
R. Lynn Clark
Reed Warner

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

applicable)

Willoughby Oil Service

Businessman, homeowner, tax
payer
Station Owner

Blonquist Mink Ranch
Wallace Enterprises Mobile Home Park

Station Owner
Blonquist Mink Ranch
Blonquist Mink Ranch
Coalville Shopping Center
Valley View Mobile Park

l4ff l
:n 24. 1983 <cont
:iai Meeting
3r Merlyn W. Johnson welcomed m e citizens :o :r,e r.<*e:.;-.« . ..-. .^:: _
cold, them that we are interested in their input. lie .icr.c-.vnsa
t there are some items that neeti to be taKen care of :cm^n: jucn
passing two sewer ordinances. There will be a bid ooeninq :ar cne
project on the sewer plant on Thursday, April 28, L983.
Please
e: Since this meeting, the bid opening has been cancelled.;
: Mayor mentioned the REGULATION OF SEWER USE Ordinance No. 1983-1
.ch is AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE USE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SEWERS
> DRAINS, PRIVATE WASTEWATER DISPOSAL, THE INSTALLATION AND CONXION OF BUILDING SEWERS, AND THE DISCHARGE OF WATERS AND WASTES
CO THE PUBLIC SEWER SYSTEM AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
ZREOF IN THE CITY OF COALVILLE, COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH,
this particular Ordinance, Article III, Section 3 needs to be
lied in. The Mayor read this item. William M. Judd made a raocion
at we put in 48 hours in Article III, Section 3, Ordinance No. 1983-1.
sseli S. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
e Mayor asked all the Councilmembers if they had a chance to go
trough the two sewer ordinances? There was a positive response,
issell S. Judd made a motion that we adopt Ordinance No. 1983-1
i the REGULATION OF SEWER USE. Colleen R. Sargent seconded the
Jtion. All ayes. The Mayor dated and signed the Ordinance as of
3d ay. This Ordinance takes affect immediately upon publication.
he Mayor mentioned that Ordinance No. 1983-2 is AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHNG THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING EQUITABLE SEWER SERVICE CHARGES TO BE
EVTED ON ALL USERS WHICH DISCHARGE WASTEWATER TO THE WASTEWATER SYSTEM
DERATED BY THE CITY OF COALVILLE AND PROVIDING CERTAIN PROHIBITIONS.
le mentioned that in this Ordinance that all residents will be charged
>12.50 a month for sewer and other sewer users will be charged accordingly. Russell S. Judd made a motion to approve Ordinance No. 1983-2
MI the sewer charge. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
Che Mayor dated and signed this Ordinance as of today. This Ordinance
will also take affect upon publication. The Mayor asked the Recorder
to send a copy of each ordinance to Wayne Thomas with the Utah State
Department of Health in Salt Lake City.
The Mayor brought up the Ad in LA basketball tournament programs. Grant
Geary made a motion to approve the bill for $45.00 seconded by Colleen
R. Sargent. All ayes.
The Mayor handed out the extra copies of the proposed zoning ordinance,
but asked that they be returned at the end of the meeting. The citizens
are mostly concerned with 2.3 E page 2-1, Amendment Application and Procedures •
Leon Simister spoke on behalf of the businessmen and they are wondering
if the Council could delay their vote for 60 days to give them time to
discuss the problems that are.a concern. They could then come back with
a list of the questions to be discussed.
The Mayor said that the ordinances have been made available for the public
for some time and the public hearing was advertised and held. We are in
need of a new zoning ordinance. Our City attorney says we need protection
of a new zoning ordinance.
Leon Simister said he has talked to three attorney's and they are puzzled that the proposed zoning has changed the general commercial from
30 blocks to 3. He feels not enough people had knowledge of the new
change in zoning.
Terry Christianson, City Attorney told Leon Simister that the publication
of the zoning hearing was required to be published one time 15 days before
the hearing. The City had it published twice with an added article in The
Summit Councy Bee put in by the Mayor.
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March _-. -USJ ; -'.
Snec Lai. Meat : ;v:*
Terry Christiansen, -Jltv Attorney reaa from .0-4-5 m "he 'J tan Jode .iSZ.
He stated chat if there is a material cnange, the :itv Council nas c -2submit the ziuinaes to the Planning Commission for its consideration. 7".:*
lomnuss; jn thcr? -a turns :he m f oraat ion to the Council vithm 7 0 ;,r.-s.
Another <:: : :-j.ir: r.z r.us; :e ae;d tivme it least .1 lavs lotL-je.
m e ~ Jl.T.i-t :r
.jp.cerr.ea that the iouncuaan wno .3 the .miser. :-Lmeen -.n« 7mr.r. m a lommissun ana the iitv Council was hot it the
rearing ma ne _sn t aere again tonignt. He feels ae snouid be hers.
leon was to id m a t ae is aosent due to his work scneauie. Leon menti-r.ea that the two committees shouid have oeen at the hearing to answer
their questions. Leon asked if they could maxe a written request of the
things they would like gone over. Russell S. Judd asked Leon why. he
wanted the zoning delayed for 60 days? Leon said that mavoe it couia :>e
done in 30 days.
Russell S. Judd said he has gone through the zoning and he.would like
to propose some changes.
Craig Vernon wanted to know where the input was when they were working
on the zoning during the last year? Leon Simister asked if the meetings
were advertised when the Planning Commission met? He never knew when
they were meeting,
William M. Judd read from 2.3 IT page 2-1, Amendment Application and Procedures. In the Conditional Use section 6.3 Public Hearing page 6-1 the
citizens feel that notifing the property owners within 1,000 feet of the
proposed conditional use is too much of an area. Coalville City isn't
very large. The City Council will let the Planning Commission.make a
recommendation on 6.2 and 6.3 page 6-1. Terry Christiansen feels that
narrowing down the feet might be a mistake, and Leon Simister feels
that the more people that are involved, the bigger the problem.
R. Lynn Clark said that the biggest concern he can see is the way the
map was zoned. General Commercial is not very big. Alot of people
bought their Land under the old General Commercial zoning and now that
some of this land is proposed to be Commercial Overlay, the market value
has dropped. Leon Simister said there is a world of difference between
the Commercial Overlay and the General Commercial.
The Mayor mentioned that the new zoning is not going to make every body
happy.
The zoning can be modified as new changes come up.
Russell S. Judd read from page 11-6, items (3) area and width requiremenci
and (4) front yard requirements in the Commercial Overlay Zone. The Planning Commission will be given this to work out.
Russell S. Judd mentioned that some of the people in town are concerned
about animals in a Residential Zone. This is mentioned on item 4, page
11-3. He is referring to Afton Blonquist wanting to expand her mink
business in the future. Russell S. Judd would like to propose that they
could be allowed to increase as long as there is adequate acreage. The
acreage would have to be spelled out so there was no question.
Stan Strebel recommended that it be added under Section 5 which is
"Supplementary and Qualifying Regulations" to be headed as Commercial
Agricultural Expansion of Non Conforming.
Terry Christiansen, City Attorney mentioned in the Commercial Overlay
on page 11-6 that public buildings anc facilities should be under a
Conditional Use not a Permitted Use. He didn't notice this before.
Leon Simister recommended that the proposed Commercial Overlay be left
at General Commercial like it was or add to the Commercial Overlay the
authorized uses as in the General Commercial such as retail, wholesale
and service establishments as permitted in item 8 page 11-5.
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March 24, 1983 (cont)
Special Meeting
George and Louise Wallace are upset with the proposed Comraarcial
Overlay because if they decide to sell their trailer park, the
market value will be cut because of the new proposed zoning. They
bought it as General Commercial and if they sell, they want to sell
it as General Commercial, not Commercial Overlay.
It was mentioned that Coalville City Is trying to keep the oil veil
business and its people out of Coalville. Russell S. Judd wanted to
set the record straight that Coalville City is not trying to keep the
oil businesses out of the City. They have provided employment for
alot of the towns people.
Dennis Wright said that it is the landowners that control the City
from growing. There are about six or seven people that will not
sell any of their land.
Leon Simister said that the restricted area of General Commercial
will not let much development come in. We are very limited on Main
Street.
The Mayor recommended that the City Council put it back in the laps
of the Planning Commission. They should advertise so the meetings
can be attended by the the people if they so desire. In 30 days
we should have it back so the Council can plan for another public
hearing.
The Mayor mentioned that the businessmen should get together and
form a Chamber of Commerce. We need someone to represent Coalville
City at the meetings we are invited to attend.
Leon Simister thanked the Planning Commission for their time in
working on the proposed zoning ordinances and for answering their
questions tonight.
Russell S. Judd mentioned that Buster Keyes would like the zoning
on his property changed to Agricultural because he felt that best
suited him for his ranching operation.
Stan Strebel suggested that the businessmen as well as any residents
make application in writting of the changes they would like to see in
the new proposed zoning ordinances. They should have this done by
Monday, April 11, 1983. They can be sent to City Hall and then given
to the Planning Commission. The Mayor will put an article in the paper
concerning this. By Monday, April 25, 1983, the revised ordinances
should be given to the City Council. An advertisement will be published on Friday, May 6, 1983 for a public hearing to be held on Monday, May 23, 1983. William M. Judd made a motion that we refer any
changes back to the Planning Commission and to follow through with
the date schedules as outlined for the ordinance work. Russell S.
Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
The citizens left at this time.

\A0
March 24, 1983 (cont)
Special Meeting

Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned that he wrote a letter to Crandall
Ford-Mercury dated March 10, 1983 concerning the $88.00 invoice no. 10742
dated January 26, 1983. A reply written the next day was read by the
Mayor. The invoice was itemized so the Council could see where the money
was used. In addition, five quarts of oil and an oil filter were used and
omitted from the invoice. William M. Judd made a motion to pay the $88.00
invoice in full. Grant Geary seconded the motion. All ayes but Russell
S. Judd who opposed.
The Mayor mentioned that Utah Power & Light needs a Minute entry for
electricity to be run to the new water storage tank at 600 South 200
East. He also needs authorization to sign a sales tax exemption certificate on the water tank and an electric Service Agreement for both
the water tank and the new sewer plant. Russell S. Judd made a motion
to enter into the agreements with Utah Power & Light on the water tank
and new sewer system. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
Terry Christiansen, City Attorney, mentioned that he will not give any
legal opinions to people who come in on City business. The Mayor or
City Council will have to do this for the people if they deem it necessary.
The reason for. this was the treatment he and his staff received when contacted by an aggrevated citizen demanding the tapes from the Planning
Commission meetings.
R. Lynn Clark mentioned that he needs 1,000 rounds of ammunition for
practice to maintain his position of being a certified officer. The
Council approved.
R. Lynn Clark showed three building permits for approval. Afton Blonquist would like to build a 25' x 200' mink shed. There are now 11 sheds
on 3.5 acres. William M. Judd made a motion to approve the permit, seconded by Grant Geary. All ayes.
Stan Strebel has a building permit for a double garage. Arnie Bosworth
would also like to put in a double garage. Grant Geary made a motion to
to accept both permits, seconded by William M. Judd. All ayes.
The Mayor mentioned that he will be tied up for the next ten Mondays beginning April 4, 1983. He has a class he has to attend. A Mayor Pro-Tea
will be appointed to take over for him at any meetings.
The Mayor mentioned the right-of-ways needed from Dave and Ren Wilde to
get to the water storage tank. Dave has agreed on one water and sewer
hookup and $1,500.00 in cash. He has requested a receipt for the hookups.
Ren Wilde could possibly settle for around $4,200.00. We can make application to HUD to help on this. We will need a 66' street between
Ren and Dave. This .8 of an acre will run around $15,000.00. A chainlink fence will be puL up on the South side of the street.
Meeting adjourned at 10.30 p.m.
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Each sign, shall lie installed in accordance with' the requirements
of t*K^r*NMh(. Inspector and
Building t^de; and meet the required specifieatiaav as to materi a l and
J » - a a y aoae- M s p e a M C l O o a d -
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beyotkttbaj

General Sign Provision*
, , (a) Permit*: Jt shall be unlawfuTlor a o j person to erect or
cuiistiuetamy asm, sign post, sign
boaxd,*psaa 4g mfifca^ awning, per*
raanent sdvertisffBieBcU accch, tor
any iiclas aUucUire above, orsr r in
or around any part of airy
or afrdesssJk, i n jtoe OUy«
^* fd ^Axtasaiog perndsston ao in
do Irecn t t e Ctty^CoimcU o r its
delegated itpiestLntativeiL
Application for such permission
shall be in writing and shall contain the name of the person tor
whose benefit the same is made,
the period of time for which such
permit is so desired, the place
where such structure is to be
erected or constructed, toe dtz&en*
sions thereof, the material of
which the same is to be oompeeed,

Is located in a
constitute a ran wince, ^
(c) Sign on Public Property:
No .ground sign shall be greeted
on public owned lands, 'inside
street right-of-way or otherwise,
except, signs owned and erected
by a^ public agency or erected by
^permission of a?e authorize^ pub*
-lie agency.
"^
tU
(d) Mohibited Signs: Ko*sign,
handbill, poster, advertisement or
notice of any kind or sort,
whether political or otherwise,
shall be fastened,, placed, posted,
/painted or attached in any way
in or upon any curbstone, lamp
poet, telephone post, telegraph
ipole, electrical light or power pole,
-iiydrant, bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk or street, except signs owned
and erected by a public agency or
erected by permission of an-authorized public agency or required
by law
^ " (e)" Signs Not to Constitute
Traffic Hazard* No sign or other
advertising structure as regulated
by this Chapter shall be erected
at the intersection of any streets
m such a manner as to -obstruct
free and clear vision, or at any
location where by reason of the
position, shape or color, it may
interfere with, obstruct the view
of, or be confused with any authorized **!&*?*• sign,, signal or device or aujneh makes use of the
word y R r T>rrfein," ••Danger"
or any o t h e r words, phrases,
symbol or character m such manner ^as to interfere with, Tntrtffwf
or confuse traffic
* *f
(f) Maintenance Every" sign
ahaIT1>e kept in good condition as
to maintenance and repair The
ground space within a radius of
ten feet from the base of any
ground sign shall be fcent free
and clear of all *eeds, rubbis£Ttnd
Inflammable maxerial The Banding Inspector may require
>dated o r ansafe ajgns to bePwTm
good condition, and upon
of the owner,to do so
may
In
TvJ»ftsi"naC6a to

a n^innntun
teet between
walk and any
sign or ground;}
Into any :
the exception ~
public necessity^
signs and name
signs governed by?
ing allowed in *one<3
00
Identification signs A
lones
d)t One or two^
efcoeeAf onr, square^
area unlighted, to I
plates, bulletin boards t
pertaining to the
lease or rental of the (
which they are located, <
ted by this Chapter,
permitted in any -requinad"'
side or rear yard. Signs
taimng to the sale of farm
ducts raised or produced *m
premises shall also be permlttedT
in any required front or rear yard
provided they are located. notf
nearer than ten feet to any lot"
(2) Bulletin boards allowed4h~
all sones. A bulletin board not exceeding eight square feet in area
erected upon the premises of a
church or other non-commercial
institution for the purpose of displaying the name and activities
of services therein may be aHowod in the front or rear yard proTided they are located not near*
er than ten feet to any aide lot
Une.
. -^
r
0 ) Signs in zone R-l, aone
RA-1, Identification signs. One or
two signs not to exceed Sour
square feet m total area attached
to the building and «mflghted.
Home occupation -atgns ^faaH be
hunted to two nnhghted^gna,Jiot
larger i n area than four aquare
feet i n total-area iifirjanaia^than
-two feet in any one jdiffafltioii and
placed inside tto* y lattdfcng; any
aign which is iignte^^jflther directly or indirectly fey juttached or
"oetached lights ^abaD^ not conterm nor be aBowaa^
(J> S i g n s ^ a ^ a f n a ^ ^ l , aone
f
to building.
^displayed shall
u ssse conduriad
or lot Sf
to the
sale -of the property, such
shall be attached flat against a
wall of the buHding or the enclosed wall, fence or neoge and parallel to its horxaontai dimensionFiat sign area lor the front of
the building shall be two square
feet for each one foot °f frontage
with inaximuxn of one hundred
square feat and a Tniilinmu of
one hundred square feet of sign

on
thar*****
not
leeFffiifrbr
lUin^aV**'
withfaFthe
Oc) Signs, in
i guliittetis tte<
nea*e^«ban4f<
!S*r<ijle*tj*-"
provided it does
inquired
(than ten
signs
front * yaxop
may be one dflCTfrfrlttanore than
three having aK*eeei « e a of
seventy-two '•qxawr4»et. Ko sign
shalm&e ptfrntad'tfr jfcreeted on or
arotthti tlte-JbuIlallgj^other than
naiofetvef fr\uifl*es^n<fr direction
sign^. 31infcer?*y|*«gn* shall be
peYmittM -^n^i%ittle ,*a*er *rtH
not -ditt^rtKtt^ jc^*j0j6hilng' >re^
denoes tn the Ticinrty.
t3) Signr-v-mtUched to 3uHdings. Any-exterior Jilgn displayed
shall pertain jOnlT°io * use conducted within the building or lot
or shall appettaln^to the lease or
sale4 of the property, such sign
shafi be attabhsd Hat against a
'wall of "the bntlrttng or the enclosed -wall, fence or hedge and
parallel -to Jfes^fcortsontal dimen*
skm^JTlat-Sign area lor the front
of the building shall be two square
feet for eaeh-«ne loot of frontage
wrth a*nudctewnn of one hundred
square feet, and a maximum of
ontUitaadced square feet- of sign
area-onencfa of the other sides of
the butknng;
*a^SfeH£^saanraeesr^
opies Xrmr*Xumgkng rstxeef&igfctof^Waya aftifloeus OC-I, -end.3W.
than»-two^&afeiqf/^tdttt « « • -not

aa*e3«co**iei*<tWicV^
a***; Traafeh^paOer*aal^«eldgTresXhe O y a^CCTatcWM/^The
insarsno* smtfliw*?1*tlie-amount
ot/<B>aaar,ptf<pirtyi' -*aJha#e^-aftd
51M0O-. pub*ek^fce«ty. « t»e
tinataa*:jji^r^reoewal -*f7«»
l n M a ^ ; y ^ > V ^ ^ ^ ^
bu i amwaalgiltliaf ttiti lifta^anbf ^
in >^lla^M^4ia^esgilNr^aTr- '
imO ^eMgew^ Bul>dtoal©n. One
la slim « ^ temporary nature tor> eadh taporeyee subdHrisiem une>er^^devft1apajent, may be
approved provided saeh signs
shatf tMt eJfeee&3e oomvAned total
ejreatasrf&undretf-eo^jare feet for
amy onycsubdivlsiop and'tnalf ito
one aYgn shalTnuceeed xme hundred scrinme-aeet -la^erea, The Xocation afraid signs shall be wttbiitr*th*;^Ribdtv**too and each that
sa*a,^signs->wiB^sit no time interfere wtth orr>ebstiruet the vision
along inieisectiag streets
•<aw- 3ufWrig^permlt Fees for
Sign*:
*» Lee*!ta«* far; „
$2fc#* «o JBflM)o

JNo (Pee
$2*0

[More ttunr *»ft&* 4O WO.W *.*tf
tHe*«:*a\aa ;#*00c*e to f7&>+0*M
Mam a * n t * » i t » «ui*ej60''ff:69
Eatfr «Wvd1t»aaaU jaWST'or
feafetfojt tiasrewf l^L!

^ 8W

'40*5-1. ©oner Operated" Dry
neairfny FnlrtHi1aaaii<L
-ia) - Requlis aeuiitg. Ucensmg:
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THE-DKVELOPME-NT ORDINANCE

OF

COALVILLE CITY, ITAH

DECEMBER J^S3

SIGNS

8.1

Standards

All signs shall conform to the requirements of this chapter. Temporary signs, described
in and conforming Co, the standards in the folloving chart may be erected without a permit.
All other signs require the issuance of a permit before placement unless specifically exempted
SIGH STANDARDS

Type/Use
1. Temporary
a* Real Estate.
b. Construction
c* Political

d. Community, Public
Events
2.- Permanent/Institutiona1
a. Church, School Bulletin
Board, flat wall or free
standing
b. Home Occupation, flat
wall, window or free
standing
c. Residential Name Plate
flat wall or free standing
3. Commercial Signs
a. Window
b. Flat Wall
c. Free Standing
d. Moving
« • -Roof-Top
l."Projecting^WaTl
g. Tow-In
h . Awnings

Time Limit

tfexii

12 months
During active
construction
60 days' before,
14 days after
election
14 days

20 S«._Ft«
2 0 Sq. Ft.

H_per_4irxiperty
1 per. b l d g . s i t e

6 Sq: F t .

Unlimited number and
may be located off
premises
Unlimited number and
may be located off
premises

5 years

60 Sq. Ft.

I per frontage

5 years

6 Sq. F t .

I per home occupation

6 Sq. Ft.

1 per residence, exempt
from permit

20 Sq. Ft.

2 0 % of window
area
120 Sq. Ft.
.120 Sq. -Ft.
120 Sq. Ft.

5 years

±*v

«q^rC

^ 0 Sq. F t .
10Z of t o t a l
awning
6 Sq. F t .

30 days

4. Directory signs for
public safety and
convenience

8.2

Size

Maximum
*u«ber.
Special
Allowed / Conditions

i per frontage
1 per frontage
1 per frontage
I—per—frontageT~per~frontage
1 p e r frontage
Must c l e a r s i d e w a l k
by 8 F t .
As needed, exempt from
permit

WuUIbHm**fH!>

1U1 HUllUwluj, l)\JLU Ul SI
**
**
W
Signs which obstruct free and clear ^vision at street intersections, which may, by
reason of position, shape, or color interfere with, obstruct the view of, or be
confused with any authorized traffic sign, signal, or device; or which makes use
of the words, "STOP", "LOOK", "DANGER", or any word(s) or symbols, etc. in such
manner as to interfere with, mislead, or confuse traffic.

8-1

8-3

Setback

All signs must be sat back at least five (5
General Commercial Zone (GC-1).
8.4

feet from property lines > except in the

Premlt Required

Unless otherwise provided herein* no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged
u n t i l the sign has-been apgrroirod and a permit issued by tha^Zonjji^dtitnlgtrator^
Sign permit* Jagi;*alld for otjpariod of f i v e (SJ^yaara and are'eubiecc'to reneief.
Applica^onJEorslgn permiti^sbail be aade to the Zoning Arfmini s t t y f o r and aba 11
include a drawing showing £faanlea Ign and location of the proposed stgn(s),,
8-5

Fee

The City Council s h a l l e s t a b l i s h a fee schedule for permanent sign permits.
8.6

Lighting of Signs

No spotlight, flood light, luminous tubes or lighted sign shall be installed
in any way which will permit the direct rays of such light to penetrate into
any residential zone or onto aay property used for residential purposes•
8.7

Existing Signs

No sign erected before the adoption of this Ordinance shall be moved to a new
location on the lot or building or enlarged or replaced unless it complies
with the provisions of this Ordinance.

8-2

Chapter 8
SIGNS

a^i

Standards

AXl signs shall conform to the requirements of thdLs
chapter. Temporary signs,, described in and conforming
tor the standards in the following chart may be erected
without a permit. All other signs require the issuance
of a permit
before placement unless specifically
exempted*
SIGN STANDARDS
Type/Use
Conditions
1. Temporary
a. Real Estate
b. Construction
c. Political
d. Community,
Public Events

Maximum
Number
Special
Maximum Size
A l l o w e d

Time- Limit
12 Months
During active
Construction
60 days before,
14 days after
election
14 days

20 Sq. Ft.
20 Sq. Ft.

1 per Property
1 per bldg. site

6 Sq. Ft.

Unlimited number
may be located of;
premises
Unlimited number
may be .located of;
premises.

20 Sq. Ft.

2. Permanent/
Institutional
a. Church, School 5 years
Bulletin Board,
flat wall or free
standing
b. Home
Occupational, flat 5 years
wall, window or
free standing
c. Residential
Name Plate, flat
wall or free standing

60 Sq. Ft.

3.
a*
b.c.
d.

20% of windows
area
120 Sq. Vt.
120 Sq. Ft.
120 Sq. Ft.
120 Sq. Ft.
20 Sq. Ft
40 Sq. Ft.
107. of total

Commercial Sign
WindowFlat wall
Free Standing
Moving

f. Project Wall
g. Tow-In
h. Awnings

5 years

30 days
58

1 per frontage

6 Sq. Ft.

1 per home
occupation

6 Sq. Ft.

1 per residence,
exempt from perml"

1 per frontage
1 per frontage
1 per frontage
1 per 'frontage
1 per frontage
1 per frontage
Must clear sidewa.

awnin-g
6 sq. Ft

4. Directory sign for
public safety and
convenience
8.2

by 8 ft.
As needed, exempt
from permit

Prohibited Signs

The following types od signs are prohibited:
A.
B.

8.3

Off premises signs, except as listed above.
Signs which
obstruct free and clear vision
at street
intersections^ which may, by reason of position, shape,
or color
interfere with, obstruct the view of, or be
confused with
any authorised traffic sign, signal, or
device;
or which ' makes use? of
the words,
"STOP",
"LOOK", "DANGER", or any word <s> or symbols, etc. in
such manner
as to interfere with,
mislead, or confuse
traffic.
Setback

All signs
must
be set back at lea^t five
(5) feet from property
lines, except in the General Commercial Zone (C-l).
8.4

Permit Required

Unless otherwise
provided herein,
no sign shall be erected,
relocated
or enlarged
until the sign has been approved
and a
permit issued by the Zoning
Administrator.
Sign permits
are
valid for a period of Five (5) years and are subject to renewal.
Application
for sign permits shall
be made to the Zoning
Administrator
and shall include a drawing showing the design and
location of the proposed sign (s).
8.5

Fee

The City Council
sign permits.
8.6

shall establish

a fee schedule

for permanent

Lighting of Signs

No spotlight, flood light, luminous tubes or lighted sign shall
be installed in any way which•will permit the direct rays of such
light to penetrate into any residential zone or onto any property
used for residential purposes.
8.7

Existing Signs

No signs erected before the adoption of this ordinance shall be
moved
to a new
location on the lot or building
or enlarged or
replaced
unless
it complies with
the
provisions of
this
59
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/ • w Treasurer

^aoA

By_

;;Bo5irr
260
> 2 4, 198U
Regular CouncxJ. Meeting.
/Tie fLAiod wa* di*cu**ed at thi* time.
ClifLton "Babe"
Blonqui*t
$r. *howed a map ofc, where the bridge on 125 SaAt 50 North wa* taken
out and where the bend in tixe river bed ofi the park keep* washing,
away.
When he meet* at the State Capital on {Hood di*ctAter,
they
need a dollar jLigiuie OA to the damage in the County.
He will
give
the amount ofc. 1.5 mLUJion dollar* which included
the City1*
two
trouble
area*.
A* {Lot the gnandAtand in the park, the City maintenance
will keep trying
to contact the County Building, 7n*pector
anything con be done on thi*.

worker*
before

Clifcton "Babe" BlonquiAt $r. mentioned that he haA al*o been
contacted about the dLitche* in Coalville
City.
There i* a question OA
to who own* the ditche*,
Coalville
City, Summit County on. the Ditch
Company.
Regardle** o£ who iA re*pon*ible9
a culvert
going under
the /toad in fcront ofc Ellen Salmon* at 83 £a*t 100 North need* to
be replaced.
The County will help on thiA i/L they are needed.
The Public Hearting on the Sign Ordinance Change wa* at thi*
time.
Woodrow Neil*on,
Planning Commi**ion wa* p/te*ent {ion. thi*.
Ronald
K. Hawkin* mentioned that it had been /lecommended by the Planning
Commi**ion to in<yiea*e the *quare Rootage on Commercial
Projection
Wall Sign* firom 20 *quare fceet to 75 *quare fieet.
Thi*
information
i* in Chapter 8, 8.1 3jL page 8-1 o£ "THE D6V6WPM6NT ORDINANCE
OF C0ALV3LLL CJTy UTAH" December 1983.
Mayor Mertyn W. $ohn*on
aAked i£ there wa* anyone present who objected to the Sign Ordinance
Change.
No one in attendance
objected.
Ronald K. Hawkin* made
a motion to accept the recommendation o£ the Planning. Commi**ion
to change the Projecting Walt *ign {Lrom 20 *quare {Leet to 75 *quare
fieet.
Colleen R. Sargent *econded the motion.
All aye*.
Ronald
K. Hawkin* will check to *ee ijL it ha* to be
advertised.
W®$%^^
jgggg^^

„hai * been
ved v the 6&?'fr&*

Leon Simi*ter
came in about the mobile home that will replace
the
*matl home belonging to Amy Potter at 118 North 50 6a*t.
He WOA
told that he neecU to get with William M. Qudd, Building.
Jn*pector
to get a building
permit.
Dannie Pollock,
DM$ft Engineering,
gave a prog^e** report
at the
*ewer plant.
The project
i* 28% complete.
The contractor*
are
*titt
ahead ofc *chedule.
There have been a couple men apply ^or
the plant operator1*
po*ition
but referenced
need to be checked
out and qualification*
approved by the State.
Dannie 1A to check
into *ome *eepage at the baAe ofc a wall at the plant.
The Li£t
Station
by Florence Wilde WOA di*cuA*ed.
The present
one need*
replaced or plan* need to be made to UAe a gravity
line.
Dannie
will check into both theAe method* fcor funding.

Su161
Su160
Removed Removed
9a
8a
9.00

Annual
Annual Difference Difference
700.00

Crandall
300.00

4,385.00
2,335.00

Flying
500.00
3,565.00
Flying
550.00
3,235.50
Executive
Flying J
5,307.15
5,970.54
605-tfCT
400.00
63,685.80
Executive
Flying J
0.00
440.00
4,653.00
5,234.63
55,836.00
610.00
Executive
0.00
Flying J
6,133.84
6,900.57
484.00
73,606.08
610.00
0.00
Flying J
5,940.00
71,280.00
6,682.50
610.00
0.00
Flying J
3,293.00
39,516.00
5,927.40
610.00
0.00
Flying J
3,293.00
39,516.00
5,927.40
610.00
0.00
Removed Removed
2,525.00
4,545.00
30,300.00
Removed Removed
0.00
Removed Removed
1,925.00
3,465.00
23,100.00
Removed Removed
0.00
Removed Removed
Removed
2,525.00
30,300.00
4,545.00
Removed
0.00
Removed Removed
2,525.00
Removed Removed
30,300.00
4,545.00
0.00
4,705.00
1,324.00
Grand Tota 52,340.49 457,439.88 53,743.04
644,916.47
Difference I 187,476.59
16 Years Life of Leases
387,840.00
Cost to Remove
4,000.00
Total Damages
579,316.59

i

|jiS

71,646.53
0.00
62,815.50
0.00
82,806.84
0.00
80,190.00
0.00
71,128.80
0.00
71,128.80
0.00
54,540.00
0.00
41,580.00
0.00
54,540.00
0.00
54,540.00
644,916.47

Removed Removed
4a
5.00
5a

ummitCo Lmb
400.00

Holiday Jolly Roger
400.00
350.00

6.00

eber Valley
400.00

Peppermill Jolly/Porter
^UttiGtrce
500.00
492.00
532.40
Peppermill Porter
250.00
600.00
Leesure _Porter
590.00- - 250.00
Doubletree Porter
250.00
645.00
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed
Removed Removed

1,456.40

Para 13 Gar

2,335.00

1,242.00

Radisson
600.00
Radisson
600.00

Factory
600.00
Factory
650.00

2,450.00

Removed
6a
7.00
Yarrow
400.00
Rodeway
Yarrow
175.00
400.00
Rodeway
Yarrow
175.00
500.00
Yarrow
550.00
Yarrow
605.00
Coalville Pott Yarrow
385.00
605.00
Coalville Pott Yarrow
385.00
595.00
Yarrow
595.00
Flyng W
Yarrow
350.00
595.00
Flying W
Removed
350.00 Removed
Flying W
Removed
350.00 Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed

Su121
Su140
Removed
7a
8.00

Moore
300.00

Classic
375.00
Classic
412.50
Classic
453.75
Classic
400.00
Classic
400.00
Classic
400.00
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed
Removed

1,995.00 4,045.00 2,441.25

Butko
400.00
Butko
400.00
Butko
418.00
Butko
418.00
Flying J
610.00
Flying J
610.00
610.00
Flying J
610.00

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
T986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Total

Para 13 Damages
$ Materials
Ave Profit
Total
Goodwill
Total

Su010
SuO:20
Su040
Su100
Removed
1.00
2.00
2a
3.00
3a
4.00
Bell
300.00
Billy's
Beil Evanson
Homes
560.00
300.00
400.00
400.00
Billy's
Bell
McDonalds
Home's
560.00
300.00
400.00
400.00
Billy's
Beil
McDonalds
Homes
560.00
300.00
400.00
440.00
Bell
McDonalds
Homes
300.00
400.00
484.00
Removed Belf
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
500.00
484.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
500.00
523.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Maverik
Park City.
Homes
Removed
350.00-—695:00
500.00
695.00- 564.84
Removed Bell
Park City McDonalds Maverik Homes
Removed
350.00
680.00
400.00
695.00 565.00
Removed Beil
Robertson McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
600.00
400.00
565.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
400.00
565.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
400.00
565.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
400.00
565.00
Removed Bell
McDonalds
Homes
Removed
350.00
400.00
565.00
Removed Vacant
McDonalds Whirl Inn Homes
Removed
400.00
300.00 565.00
1,680.00
4.050.00 1.975.00 5,500.00 14.335.00

11,864.00
2x
23,728.00
10000/YR 120,000.00
143,728.00

•<0.

Grant M&cfarlane, Jr. (2040)
Janes L. Barker (0205)
Kira E. Hacfarlane f7Q81)
Attorneys for Plaintiff

F IL E D
^EB 1 1996

1912 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 209
P»0. Box 680X06
Parfc City, Utah 84O68-O106
Tel: (80X)

Clem of Surnnm Co^ i cy

jMr-

3yDwHyOtrfc

IB THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

COALVILLE CITY,
Plaintiffs
v.
ALVIN R. LUNDGRElf, dba
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
et al.,

Civil No. 82-039-6856
Judge Brian

Defendants•
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff, Coalville City,
cross-appeals to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that portion of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree dated October 26,
1995 that awarded the Defendant Alvin R. Lundgren pre-judgment
interest.

Plaintiff further seeks award of additional attorney's

fees incurred in this appeal.
DATED this \ ^

day of February, 1996.

usa<C

Kira E. Macfarlai
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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